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Introduction
The Master standing by a stream, said, ‘It passes on just like this, not ceasing day
or night!’ — Chapter XVII, Book IX, Confucian Analects (English translation
by James Legge)
In the last century, our society has been experiencing new tides of technological
revolution triggered by explosive application of information and communication
technology. The innovation and application of new technology invokes profound
influences on the evolution of financial markets. Since the last decade, the ad-
vances of electronic security trading have been one of the dominant characteristics
in the evolution of financial markets. The comprehensive application of electronic
trading in financial markets forces stock exchanges to adopt a new generation of
the security trading platform - Electronic Security Trading System, e.g. Xe-
tra (Frankfurt Stock Exchange), SETS (London Stock Exchange), and Universal
Trading Platform (NYSE Euronext). Security markets in some countries have
been dominated by electronic security trading systems. For example, over 90%
of security transactions in Germany are executed by Xetra System operated by
Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
There are three main advantages of using electronic security trading platforms
instead of trading on conventional floor markets. First, electronic platforms pro-
vide more real-time trading information in the trading process. Second, electronic
trading platforms are more transparent than conventional floor markets. Secu-
rity prices are stipulated according to well-specified trading rules while market
makers in conventional floor markets have considerable influence on the price
determination. This ‘black-box’ argument applies in particular for prices which
are negotiated among a small number of dealers. Third, transaction costs of elec-
tronic security trading platforms are on average lower than those of conventional
floor markets.
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These advantages together with the competition among global stock exchanges
further accelerate the process of establishing electronic security trading platforms
in many countries. For example, with the reference to the electronic trading
system Xetra in Germany, China has started to launch an electronic trading
platform called New Generation Trading Systems (NGTS).
Despite the popularity of electronic security trading systems, little is known about
the microeconomic foundation of trading mechanisms in these markets, e.g. see
Harris (1990), Huang & Stoll (1991), and O’Hara (1995).
Due to the lack of a proper formalization of trading mechanisms in electronic
security trading systems, each electronic trading platform has its own set of trad-
ing rules, thus ‘ ... it is neither easy nor useful to describe how each trading
mechanism works. But it is possible to discuss the operations of a specific mecha-
nism, and detail, at least in principle, how mechanism of that type actually work.’
(O’Hara 1995, p. 9). Following this line, we consider one specific electronic se-
curity trading system, i.e. Xetra system operated by Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
The official brochure Gruppe Deutsche Bo¨rse (2003) published by Frankfurt Stock
Exchange provides a comprehensive description of Xetra market model with an
explicit stipulation of certain trading rules.
According to Gruppe Deutsche Bo¨rse (2003), Xetra is an order-driven system
in which traders can trade securities either in the form of continuous trading or
in the form of Xetra auction by submitting certain types of order specifications
through a computer interface. A central computer system then collects order
specifications into a central order book and determines the security trading price
and the trading volume according to well-specified trading rules.
There are two order sizes in Xetra, round lots and odd lots. Round lots correspond
to a specific size designated to each security by the system, called round lot size.
A round lot has one or multiple of the round lot size. Any order sizes other than
round lots are referred to as odd lots. For example, if Xetra designates a round
lot size of 200 shares for a certain security. An order specification with order
size of 250 contains one round lot which size is 200, and one odd lot which size
is 250− 200 = 50. Only round lots are accepted in continuous trading while all
order sizes are allowed in Xetra auction.
Xetra accepts three basic order types: limit orders, market orders, and market-
to-limit orders. A limit order is an order specification to buy or sell a security at
a specific price called limit (price) or better. A market order is an unlimited order
specification to buy or sell a security at the next trading price determined. A
market-to-limit order is an unlimited order specification to buy or sell a security.
3When a market-to-limit order enters the order book, it is treated as a market
order and is to be executed by Xetra at the best possible price immediately. The
unexecuted part of the market-to-limit order will enter the order book as a limit
order with the limit price equal to the trading price of the executed part.
In order to support trading strategies, Xetra introduces stop orders as an addi-
tional order type, see (Gruppe Deutsche Bo¨rse 2003, p. 13). When a stop order
enters Xetra, a special price called stop price must be designated. The stop order
will not enter the order book until the current trading price reaches the stop price
to ‘trigger’ the stop order. Currently there are two types of stop order in Xetra,
the stop market order and the stop limit order. The stop market order enters
the order book as a market order when the current trading price reaches the stop
price, goes over the stop price for stop buy orders, or goes below the stop price
for stop sell orders. The stop limit order enters the order book as a limit order
when the current trading price reaches the stop price, goes over the stop price
for stop buy orders, or goes below the stop price for stop sell orders.
In order to support large volume transactions without tremendously effecting
the market, Xetra enables traders to enter iceberg order in which a mandatory
limit price, an overall volume, and a peak volume must be specified. The overall
volume of the iceberg order is fully considered in Xetra auction. In continuous
trading, only the peak volume participates in the order book as the visible part
of the iceberg order. When the peak volume in the order book is fully executed,
a new peak is entered into the order book if the overall volume of the iceberg
order is not totally fulfilled.
In addition, qualified traders in Xetra can submit quotes which are always treated
in the order book as two synchronous order specifications (a limit buy order and
a limit sell order).
A trading day of Xetra begins with the pre-trading phase followed by the trading
phase and post-trading phase. Pre-trading phase and post-trading phase are the
same for all securities, while different trading models and trading time schedules
are applied in the trading phase according to the segmentation of securities.
In the pre-trading phase, traders can submit orders and quotes, and modify or
delete existing orders and quotes. The order book is closed during this phase.
Only the last trading price or the best sell/buy limits of the last auction of the
previous day are displayed. In the post-trading phase, again, traders can submit
orders and quotes, and modify or delete existing orders and quotes. No transac-
tions happen after the post-trading phase and before the pre-trading phase.
Xetra supports two trading models in the trading phase:
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1. Continuous trading in connection with auctions, which starts with an opening
auction and is followed by continuous trading. Continuous trading can be
interrupted by one or several intraday auction(s) and ends with either a closing
auction or an end-of-day auction which is after an intraday closing auction
followed by another segment of continuous trading.
2. One or more auctions per day at a predefined time schedule.
 Auction )
( End of day
Closing
( Intraday
 Closing
 Auction )
PhasePhase
Pre-trading Post-tradingTrading phase
Opening
AuctionAuctionAuction
Auction
Auction
AuctionContinuousContinuous
TradingTrading ......
1.Continuous
trading
in connection
with
auctions
...... ......
2.One or
more
auctions
Figure 1: Two Xetra trading models.
As depicted above, these two Xetra trading models are essentially composed of
the trading forms of continuous trading and Xetra auction.
Continuous trading accepts only round lot orders. Each new incoming order is
immediately checked against the other side of the order book. The execution of
orders is based on price/time priority. The order book is open during the course
of continuous trading. Xetra discloses real-time trading data of the order book,
e.g. limits, accumulated order volumes per limit, and the accumulated number
of orders per limit.
Xetra auction accepts all order sizes and is composed of three phases: a call
phase, a price determination phase, and an order book balancing phase. During
the call phase, traders may submit order specifications. An order is tagged with
5a time-priority index and is collected in a central order book. The order book in
the call phase remains partially closed and traders obtain the indicative price or
the best sell/buy limits. In certain segmentation of securities, market imbalance
information may be disseminated as well. The call phase has a random end after
a fixed minimum time span in order to avoid price manipulation. It is followed by
the price determination phase in which the auction price is determined according
to Xetra auction trading rules. Once the auction price has been stipulated, orders
are matched and transactions are carried out. For securities without market
imbalance information, the surplus is offered again to the market in the order
book balancing phase when not all orders in the order book can be fully executed.
At the end of the auction process, all orders which were not or only partially
executed are transferred to the next possible trading form or deleted according
to their trading restrictions.
In essence, continuous trading and Xetra auction fall into the category of multi-
unit double auction in which both sellers and buyers can submit order specifica-
tions in diversified trading quantity in order to trade on well-defined commodities
or securities. The trading mechanism of continuous trading in Xetra is equiva-
lent to a continuous double auction market known by experimentalists (known
by practitioners as an open-out-cry market), and the trading mechanism of Xetra
auction is equivalent to a clearinghouse (also known as a call market), cf. Fried-
man & Rust (1991). Xetra system is thus a hybrid market which contains the
trading mechanism of continuous double auction and of clearinghouse.
Trading rules for Xetra auction and for continuous trading are explicitly depicted
in Gruppe Deutsche Bo¨rse (2003). Despite the clarity of the corresponding trad-
ing rules in Xetra, literature in financial markets so far has provided little under-
standing on the nature of the formation of trading prices and final transactions
in the system and on its implication for possible investment strategies. The
price mechanism of electronic security markets has intuitively been described in
Sharpe, Alexander & Bailey (1999), however, without formal rigor.
This work is intimately related to the theory of market microstructure which
studies how the trading price and allocation are determined explicitly under the
structure of specific trading mechanisms, e.g. see O’Hara (1995) and Stoll (2003).
While a number of research in this strand has been engaged in the investigation
of electronic trading platforms either from an empirical aspect, e.g. see Ahn, Bae
& Chan (2001), Ellis, Michaely & O’Hara (2002), and Conrad, Johnson & Wahal
(2003), or from an experimental aspect, e.g. see Sunder (1995) and Bloomfield,
O’Hara & Saar (2005), only relatively little emphasis has been put on formal-
izing trading mechanisms of auctions in electronic security trading platforms so
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far. The lack of contribution in this topic is related to the fact that auctions
in electronic security trading platforms belong to the type of multi-unit double
auction since traders can submit an order specification with arbitrary quantity.
Even in the scope of auction theory, the price determination and allocation mech-
anism in multi-unit double auction is still an open issue, see Friedman & Rust
(1991) and Krishna (2002). Thus, the formalization of the trading mechanism
in Xetra auction is essential both from the perspective of the theory of market
microstructure and from that of auction theory.
Another concern in this work is the investment decision in Xetra auction mar-
ket. Investment decision investigated in modern finance are generally based on
the assumption of price taker, e.g. see Markowitz (1952), Merton (1992), and
Horst & Wenzelburger (2008). This assumption considers that the investor’s
trading behavior has no impact on the market. On the other hand, Xetra auc-
tion determines the trading price according to the central order book which is an
aggregation of orders submitted by traders. The trading price is dependent on
the order specification that the trader submits. Thus the trader in Xetra auc-
tion market could potentially influence the trading price by its trading behavior,
which implies that the trader is essentially not a price taker in Xetra auction
market.
Xetra auction market provides traders with the knowledge on Xetra auction trad-
ing rules and the real-time trading information of the central order book which
conventional floor markets are unlikely to provide. Given the knowledge on Xe-
tra auction pricing rules, the price determination in Xetra auction market is no
longer a ‘black box’ to traders. The trader can perceive the order book situ-
ation by combining its order to submit with the observation on the real-time
order book. Then the trader can construct its forecast on the trading price by
applying the knowledge on Xetra auction pricing rules to compute the trading
price associated with its perceived order book. The trader’s subjective forecast
on the trading price has the control variable of the trader’s order to submit. This
implies that the trader is a price setter who can manipulate the trading price by
its trading behavior.
To complete the investment decision model for the trader in Xetra auction market,
it is necessary to incorporate the trader’s forecast on the trading price with the
portfolio selection model. We consider in this work the mean-variance model (M-
V model in short), see Markowitz (1952) and Markowitz (1991). By integrating
the forecast on the trading price with the M-V model, we construct an extended
M-V model that depicts the investment decision of the price setter in Xetra
auction market. As Xetra auction market only accepts integer shares of trading
7quantity, we develop a computational procedure to calculate the integer solution
for the extended M-V model.
The last part of this work is to develop a financial market model for Xetra auction
market where the interactions among traders and Xetra auction market mecha-
nism generate the non market-clearing price dynamics. This requires an appro-
priate representation of complex interactions among traders and Xetra auction
market mechanism in the dynamics of Xetra auction market.
The dynamic process of complex interactions among economic entities can be
modelled by applying the methodology of Agent-based Computational Economics
(ACE) that is a computational study on the dynamical economic system from
‘bottom-up’, see Tesfatsion (2006). Economists in this strand construct the ACE
model for the economic system by modelling the interaction of agents that rep-
resent economic entities in the system.
ACE researchers have successfully handled complex financial market systems and
have constructed agent-based financial market models with explicit forms of mar-
ket mechanisms to determine market prices and trading volumes. For instance,
Das (2003) introduced an agent-based financial market model which adopted a
simple version of single-unit double auction as the explicit market mechanism to
generate the market dynamics. Although the market mechanism considered in
Das (2003) does not share the same type of auctions as Xetra auction market
mechanism that belongs to the type of multi-unit double auction, the success
of introducing explicit market mechanism in the agent-based financial market
model suggests the possibility of applying the methodology of ACE modelling to
construct the agent-based model with an explicit formulation of Xetra auction
market mechanism.
The current difficulty of constructing agent-based models for financial market
systems is the lack of general principles that economists can apply to construct
agent-based models, see LeBaron (2006). In order to overcome this difficulty,
we develop an integrative framework for ACE modelling that serves as general
principles to investigate economic systems from ‘bottom-up’ and to construct
the corresponding ACE models. Then we apply this integrative framework to
construct the ACE model of Xetra auction market. With the implementation of
the ACE model by employing the computer programming language, we conduct
the computational simulation to generate the non market-clearing price dynamics
of Xetra auction market.
The structure of this work is as follows. Chapter 1 presents the formal model of
Xetra auction price mechanism and the allocation mechanism. Then it investi-
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gates the economic properties of Xetra auction allocation mechanism. Chapter
2 explores the economic properties of Xetra auction price mechanism. Then it
develops a set of improved auction pricing rules that are regarded as an improve-
ment on Xetra auction pricing rules from the perspective of market efficiency.
Chapter 3 investigates the investment decision of the price setter in Xetra auc-
tion market. It starts with constructing the trader’s subjective forecast on Xetra
auction price. Then it presents the extended M-V model which integrates the con-
ventional M-V model with the trader’s subjective forecast on Xetra auction price.
This chapter ends with the computational procedure for calculating the integer
solution for the extended M-V model. Chapter 4 starts with the depiction on
the integrative framework for ACE modelling. Then it applies this framework to
construct the ACE model of Xetra auction market. With the implementation of
the ACE model by employing the computer programming language Groovy/Java,
this chapter presents simulation results of market dynamics. This work ends with
concluding remarks presented in Chapter 5.
Chapter 1
Xetra Auction Market Mechanism
This chapter provides a formal model of Xetra auction market mechanism for limit
orders and market orders. Xetra auction market mechanism handles several types
of orders: limit orders, market orders, market-to-limit orders, iceberg orders, stop
orders, and quotes. Market-to-limit orders are considered as market orders when
entering the order book. Iceberg orders are considered as limit orders. Stop
orders, depending on the imposed trading restrictions, are regarded as either
market orders or limit orders when entering the order book. Quotes are handled
as two simultaneous orders (a limit bid and a limit ask) in the order book. In
essence, Xetra auction market mechanism handles two types of orders in the order
book: limit orders and market orders. An order specification with a claim to sell
is called an ask (limit/market) order, and an order with a claim to buy is called
a bid (limit/market) order, see Gruppe Deutsche Bo¨rse (2003).
The market mechanism mentioned in the rest of this chapter refers to Xetra auc-
tion market mechanism, the price mechanism refers to Xetra auction price mecha-
nism, and the allocation mechanism refers to Xetra auction allocation mechanism
when no ambiguity happens. To model the market mechanism, we start from for-
malizing the concepts of limit orders and market orders in Section 1.1. Then we
depict demand and supply schedule in Xetra auction market which are aggre-
gation of limit orders and market orders. Section 1.2 describes Xetra auction
pricing rules and proposes a formal presentation of the price mechanism. Section
1.3 formulates the allocation mechanism and investigates its properties.
1.1 Demand and Supply Schedule
During the call phase, Xetra auction collects all asks and bids submitted by
traders in a central order book, tagged with a time-priority index. The call phase
stops randomly after a fixed minimum time span. Assume that there are I + 1
bids indexed by i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , I} and J + 1 asks indexed by j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , J}
when the call phase stops. In particular, assume that bid 0 and ask 0 are market
orders while the rest are limit orders. Hence, {1, . . . , I} is the index set of limit
9
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bids and {1, . . . , J} the index set of limit asks.
Further assume that the order book situation is composed of bid 0 represented
by a non-negative quantity d0 ≥ 0 and each bid i ∈ {1, . . . , I} by a price-quantity
pair (ai, di) stating the intention to buy di ≥ 0 shares when the Xetra auction
price is no higher than ai > 0; ask 0 is represented by a non-negative quantity
s0 ≥ 0 and ask j ∈ {1, . . . , J} by a price-quantity pair (bj , sj) stating the intention
to sell sj ≥ 0 shares when the auction price is no lower than bj > 0.
The price determination phase is invoked right after the call phase. The order
book situation at the end of the call phase as well as a reference price Pref
referred to the last trading price in Xetra are regarded as information inputs in
the market mechanism. Thus, the information inflows to the market mechanism
is assumed as follows.
Assumption 1.1 (Assumption of Order Book). At the end of the call phase,
Xetra auction market mechanism obtains an order book data set I0 which contains
all data of the order book and a reference price Pref from Xetra:
I0 := {d0, (a1, d1), . . . , (aI , dI); s0, (b1, s1), . . . , (bJ , sJ);Pref}. (1.1)
Order specifications contained in I0 constitute the demand and the supply sched-
ule of the market when the trading price and the trading volume are determined.
We start from the formal presentation of individual bids and asks, i.e. individual
demand and supply schedules.
1.1.1 Demand-to-buy Schedule
For bid 0 which is a market order with a non-negative quantity d0, the corre-
sponding individual demand function is defined as:
L
D
0 :
{
R+ −→ R+
p 7−→ d0.
Each bid i ∈ {1, . . . , I} consists of a price-quantity pair (ai, di). Let 1ADi (p)
denote a characteristic function of the compact interval ADi = [0, ai] such that
1ADi (p) :=
{
1 when p ∈ ADi ,
0 when p ∈ R+ \ A
D
i .
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Price
Quantity
d0
L
D
0 (p)
(a) Market order: bid 0
Price
Quantity
ai
di
L
D
i (p)
(b) Limit order: bid i
Figure 1.1: Individual demand function.
Price
Quantity
α0
α1
αI−1
αI = d0
a1 a2 aI
ΦD(p)
Figure 1.2: Aggregate demand function.
Then the individual demand function which represents bid i is the step function:
L
D
i :
{
R+ −→ R+
p 7−→ di1ADi (p).
(1.2)
The aggregate demand function is defined as the sum of individual demand func-
tions:
ΦD :
{
R+ −→ R+
p 7−→
∑I
i=0 L
D
i (p).
(1.3)
Without loss of generality, assume aI > . . . > a2 > a1 > 0. Then we obtain the
explicit form of aggregate demand function as follows:
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Lemma 1.1. Let aI > . . . > a2 > a1 > 0. The aggregate demand function ΦD(p)
is non-increasing and takes the form:
ΦD(p) =
I∑
i=0
αi1Ai(p), p ∈ R+, (1.4)
where αi := d0 +
∑I
k=i+1 dk for i = 0, 1, . . . , I − 1; αI := d0; and A0 := [0, a1];
Ai := (ai, ai+1] for i = 1, . . . , I − 1; AI := (aI ,+∞).
Proof. The market order of bid 0 is executable for any p ∈ R+. {A0, . . . , AI}
is by construction a partition of R+. Let i∗ ∈ {0, . . . , I − 1} be arbitrary but
fixed. Then p ∈ Ai∗ implies that all bids i = 0, i∗ + 1, . . . , I are executable. The
corresponding aggregate volume is αi∗ = d0 +
∑I
k=i∗+1
dk. p ∈ AI implies that
only bid 0 is executable. The corresponding aggregate volume is αI = d0. This
establishes the explicit form of aggregate demand function. ΦD is non-increasing
since α0 > α1 > . . . > αI .
1.1.2 Supply-to-sell Schedule
For ask 0 which is a market order with a non-negative quantity s0, the corre-
sponding individual supply function is defined as:
L
S
0 :
{
R+ −→ R+
p 7−→ s0.
Each ask j ∈ {1, . . . , J} consists of a price-quantity pair (bj , sj). Let 1BSj (p)
denote the characteristic function of the interval BSj = [bj ,+∞), the individual
supply function which represents ask j is then the step function:
L
S
j :
{
R+ −→ R+
p 7−→ sj1BSj (p).
(1.5)
The aggregate supply function is defined as the sum of individual supply functions
ΦS :
{
R+ −→ R+
p 7−→
∑J
j=0 L
S
j (p).
(1.6)
Without loss of generality, let bJ > . . . > b2 > b1 > 0. Then we obtain the
explicit form of the aggregate supply function as follows.
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s0
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0 (p)
(a) Market order: ask 0
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bj
sj
L
S
j (p)
(b) Limit order: ask j
Figure 1.3: Individual supply function.
Price
Quantity
β0 = s0
β1
βJ−1
βJ
b1 b2 bJ
ΦS(p)
Figure 1.4: Aggregate supply function.
Lemma 1.2. Let bJ > . . . > b2 > b1 > 0. The aggregate supply function ΦS(p)
is non-decreasing and takes the form:
ΦS(p) =
J∑
j=0
βj1Bj (p), p ∈ R+, (1.7)
where β0 := s0; βj := s0 +
∑j
k=1 sk for j = 1, . . . , J ; and B0 := [0, b1); Bj :=
[bj , bj+1) for j = 1, . . . , J − 1; BJ := [bJ ,+∞).
Proof. The market order of ask 0 is executable for any p ∈ R+. {B0, . . . , BJ}
is by construction a partition of R+. p ∈ B0 implies that only ask 0 is executable.
The corresponding aggregate volume is β0 = s0. Let j∗ ∈ {1, . . . , J} be arbitrary
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but fixed. Then p ∈ Bj∗ implies that all asks j = 0, 1, . . . , j∗ are executable.
The corresponding aggregate volume is βj∗ = s0 +
∑j∗
k=1 sk. This establishes the
explicit form of aggregate supply function. ΦS is non-decreasing since βJ > . . . >
β1 > β0.
1.2 Xetra Auction Price Mechanism
Xetra auction price is determined according to a set of well-specified pricing rules
described in (Gruppe Deutsche Bo¨rse 2003, p. 34). We denote Xetra auction
price as PXetra and summarize Xetra auction pricing rules as follows:
We denote the limit price with the highest executable order volume and the lowest
surplus as the candidate price.
Rule 1. The auction price is the candidate price if there is only one candidate
price.
Rule 2. If there is more than one candidate price, then there are four cases:
Rule 2.1. If the surplus for all candidate prices is on the demand side, then
the auction price is stipulated as the highest candidate price.
Rule 2.2. If the surplus for all candidate prices is on the supply side, then
the auction price is stipulated as the lowest candidate price.
Rule 2.3. If there is no surplus for all candidate prices, the reference price
Pref is included as an additional criterion. The auction price is determined
as follows:
Rule 2.3.1. The auction price is the highest candidate price if the ref-
erence price is higher than the highest candidate price.
Rule 2.3.2. The auction price is the lowest candidate price if the refer-
ence price is lower than the lowest candidate price.
Rule 2.3.3. The auction price is the reference price if the reference price
lies between the highest candidate price and the lowest candidate price.
Rule 2.4. If there are some candidate prices with a surplus on the supply
side and others with a surplus on the demand side, then the upper bound
price is chosen as the lowest candidate price with a surplus on the supply
side and the lower bound price is chosen as the highest candidate price
with a surplus on the demand side. The lower bound price is always less
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than the upper bound price as we will show later. Xetra determines the
auction price with these two prices and the reference price Pref :
Rule 2.4.1. The auction price is the upper bound price if the reference
price is higher than the upper bound price.
Rule 2.4.2. The auction price is the lower bound price if the reference
price is lower than the lower bound price.
Rule 2.4.3. The auction price is the reference price if the reference price
lies between the upper bound price and the lower bound price.
Rule 3. If there are only market orders on both sides of the order book, then the
auction price is the reference price Pref .
Rule 4. If Rule 1 to Rule 3 fails, there is no auction price.
1.2.1 Trading Volume and Surplus
Let p ∈ R+ be some arbitrary price such that the aggregate demand ΦD(p) may
be unequal to the aggregate supply ΦS(p), then only the minimum of ΦD(p) and
ΦS(p) could possibly be traded in Xetra auction. The quantity which is feasible
to trade is called the executable order volume and is defined by:
ΦV :
{
R+ −→ R+
p 7−→ min{ΦD(p), ΦS(p)}.
(1.8)
The function (1.8) is also referred as the trading volume function. The excess
demand function is given by:
ΦZ :
{
R+ −→ R
p 7−→ ΦD(p)− ΦS(p).
(1.9)
Xetra auction refers the absolute value of excess demand |ΦZ(p)| as the surplus.
1.2.2 Xetra Auction Price Model
Given the data set I0 of Assumption 1.1, Xetra auction determines a unique
auction price PXetra by applying Xetra auction pricing rules. Only limit prices
are taken into account by Xetra auction pricing rules. Let Ω0 denote the set of all
limit prices considered in I0. When there is no limit price in the order book, i.e.
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Ω0 = ∅, Xetra auction checks if there are market orders on both sides (demand
side and supply side) of the order book. Xetra auction then chooses the reference
price Pref as the auction price when market orders exist on both sides, i.e. d0 > 0
and s0 > 0. When market orders do not exist in both sides, there is no auction
price in Xetra auction market.1
When there exists limit prices in the order book with Ω0 = {a1, . . . , aI , b1, . . . , bJ},
Xetra auction computes the highest executable order volume Vmax which is the
maximum value of trading volume ΦV (p) for all limit price p ∈ Ω0 such that
Vmax := max {ΦV (p) | p ∈ Ω0}. (1.10)
Notice that Vmax exists and is finite since ΦV (p) is finite and bounded in Ω0. The
set of volume maximizing prices is defined by
ΩV := {p ∈ Ω0 | ΦV (p) = Vmax},
which is non-empty and finite. When the order book is uncrossed with Vmax = 0,
the executable order volume is zero. No transaction will be carried out in Xetra
auction, and hence no Xetra auction price exists in the market.
When there exists executable order volume with Vmax > 0 and a non-empty set
Ω0, Xetra auction computes the lowest surplus Zmin defined by
Zmin := min
{
|ΦZ(p)|
∣∣ p ∈ ΩV }. (1.11)
Candidate prices that correspond to the highest executable order volume and the
lowest surplus are given by
ΩZ :=
{
p ∈ ΩV
∣∣ |ΦZ(p)| = Zmin}.
Since ΩV is well defined and finite, Zmin exists and ΩZ is also well defined and
non-empty. Denote
PZ := maxΩZ and PZ := minΩZ
as the highest candidate price and the lowest candidate price in ΩZ respectively.
When there is only one candidate price, the unique candidate price is chosen as
Xetra auction price with PXetra = PZ = PZ .
1In this case, Xetra auction will take a market order interruption: the call phase will be
extended for a limited time span and market participants can submit new order specifications
and quotes, modify or delete existing order specifications and quotes. The call phase terminates
once all market orders in the order book can be fully executed or the time extension has expired,
see (Gruppe Deutsche Bo¨rse 2003, p. 30).
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Obviously, there could be more than one candidate price with ♯ΩZ > 1. According
to Rule 2.1, when all candidate prices are with a surplus on the demand side,
i.e. ΦZ(p) > 0 for all p ∈ ΩZ , the highest candidate price PZ is chosen as Xetra
auction price with PXetra = PZ .
According to Rule 2.2, when all candidate prices are with a surplus on the supply
side, i.e. ΦZ(p) < 0 for all p ∈ ΩZ , the lowest candidate price PZ is chosen as
Xetra auction price with PXetra = PZ .
Otherwise, there could be no surplus for all candidate prices or there could be a
surplus on the demand side for some candidate prices while others with a surplus
on the supply side. In these two cases, the reference price Pref is introduced to
determine Xetra auction price.
In the first case that corresponds to Rule 2.3, Xetra auction compares the ref-
erence price Pref with the highest candidate price PZ and the lowest candidate
price PZ to choose one of these three prices as Xetra auction price according to
pricing rules described in Rule 2.3.1, Rule 2.3.2, and Rule 2.3.3.
In the second case that corresponds to Rule 2.4, Xetra auction chooses the upper
bound price Pmax that is the lowest candidate price with a surplus on the supply
side and the lower bound price Pmin that is the highest candidate price with a
surplus on the demand side. The upper bound price and the lower bound price
are formulated as:
Pmax := min{p ∈ ΩZ | ΦZ(p) = −Zmin},
Pmin := max{p ∈ ΩZ | ΦZ(p) = Zmin}.
The upper bound price Pmax and the lower bound price Pmin are well defined in
this case. Notice that Pmax > Pmin since ΦZ(p) is non-increasing and ΦZ(Pmax) <
0 < ΦZ(Pmin). Xetra auction compares the reference price Pref with the upper
bound price Pmax and the lower bound price Pmin to choose one of these three
prices as Xetra auction price according to pricing rules stated in Rule 2.4.1, Rule
2.4.2, and Rule 2.4.3. Xetra auction pricing rules are summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1.1. Given the order book data set I0 in Assumption 1.1, Xetra auction
determines a unique auction price PXetra whenever it is possible.
If Ω0 6= ∅ and Vmax > 0, then PXetra exists and is determined as follows:
(i) If ♯ΩZ = 1, then PXetra = PZ = PZ;
(ii) If ♯ΩZ > 1, then
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PXetra =


PZ , if ΦZ(PZ) > 0,
PZ , if ΦZ(PZ) < 0,
max{PZ ,min{Pref , PZ}}, if ΦZ(PZ) = ΦZ(PZ) = 0,
max{Pmin,min{Pref , Pmax}}, if ΦZ(PZ) > 0 and ΦZ(PZ) < 0;
(1.12)
where PZ = maxΩZ , PZ = minΩZ , and Pmax = min{p ∈ ΩZ | ΦZ(p) = −Zmin}
with Pmin = max{p ∈ ΩZ | ΦZ(p) = Zmin}.
If only market orders exist such that Ω0 = ∅ with d0 > 0 and s0 > 0, then the
auction price is PXetra = Pref .
Otherwise, the auction price PXetra remains unspecified.
Proof. Ω0 6= ∅ implies that there exists at least one limit order, and Vmax > 0
implies that ΩZ 6= ∅. Thus, Rule 1 and Rule 2 are considered when Vmax > 0 and
Ω0 6= ∅.
Rule 1 states that PXetra = PZ = PZ when ♯ΩZ = 1, and Rule 2 describes
four cases when ♯ΩZ > 1, which corresponds to equation (1.12). Rule 2.1 corre-
sponds to the case of all price p ∈ ΩZ having the same surplus on the demand
side for ΦZ(p) > 0. Xetra auction price under this rule is PXetra = PZ when
ΦZ(PZ) > 0. Analogously, Rule 2.2 corresponds to all price p ∈ ΩZ having
the same surplus on the supply side for ΦZ(p) < 0. Xetra auction price under
this rule is PXetra = PZ when ΦZ(PZ) < 0. According to Rule 2.3, Xetra auc-
tion price is PXetra = max
{
PZ ,min{Pref , PZ}
}
when there is no surplus for all
p ∈ ΩZ with ΦZ(PZ) = ΦZ(PZ) = 0. Rule 2.4 states the case of ΦZ(PZ) < 0 and
ΦZ(PZ) > 0. Rule 2.4.1, Rule 2.4.2, and Rule 2.4.3 stipulate Xetra auction price
as PXetra = max{Pmin,min{Pref , Pmax}}.
Rule 3 refers to the case that market orders exist on both market sides with no
limit orders in the order book, i.e. d0 > 0 and s0 > 0 with Ω0 = ∅. Xetra auction
price in this case is PXetra = Pref . Rule 4 is applied when Rule 1 to Rule 3 fail.
There is no Xetra auction price PXetra in this case.
Theorem 1.1 is a formal characterization of Xetra auction pricing rules. Given
any order book situation, Theorem 1.1 determines a unique Xetra auction price
PXetra whenever it exists. The price determination process for Xetra auction is
depicted in the form of flowchart in Appendix A. We demonstrate in the following
example how to apply Theorem 1.1 to determine Xetra auction price PXetra.
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Example 1.1. Consider an order book containing three bid orders with price-
quantity pairs (198, 100), (200, 100), and (201, 150). It also contains one ask
order with the price-quantity pair (199, 100). The order book situation is shown
in Figure 1.5.
Price
Quantity
ΦD(p)
ΦS(p)
100
150
250
350
0
198 199 200 201 202 203
Figure 1.5: Crossed order book in Example 1.1.
Xetra auction first computes Vmax = 100 for Ω0 = {198, 199, 200, 201} 6= ∅. Since
Vmax = 100 > 0, the set of all volume maximizing prices is ΩV = {199, 200, 201}.
The lowest surplus is Zmin = 50. The set of all candidate prices is ΩZ = {201}
where the highest candidate price is equal to the lowest candidate price with
PZ = PZ = 201. Since ♯ΩZ = 1, Xetra auction price is PXetra = PZ = PZ = 201
according to case (i) in Theorem 1.1.
1.3 Xetra Auction Allocation Mechanism
Given Xetra auction price PXetra, Xetra auction allocation mechanism computes
the final transaction for each order specification.
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1.3.1 Xetra Auction Allocation Model
The order execution in Xetra auction is based on the time priority. When an
order is submitted to the order book, it is labelled with a time tag. The time
tag attached to each order determines the time priority of the order and thus the
ranking of its execution in the order book. There are two execution sequences
corresponding to the demand side (bids) and the supply side (asks).
Denote the execution priority of bid i by ιd(i) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , I} and the execution
priority of ask j by ιs(j) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , J} respectively. The position in the execu-
tion sequence of bid i is then ιd(i), which implies that there are ιd(i) bids which
will be executed prior to bid i. Analogously, there are ιs(j) asks which will be
executed prior to ask j. Market orders always have higher execution priority than
limit orders, thus bid 0 and ask 0 are positioned with the ranking of ιd(0) = 0 and
ιs(0) = 0. The final transaction for each order is highly affected by its position
in the execution sequence since Xetra auction applies the rule of First Come
First Serve (FCFS) for the order execution.2
Given the fixed ranking of the execution sequence, bid i will not be executed until
all higher ranked bids are executed. The maximum feasible quantity that bid i can
get is therefore the quantity that higher ranked bids have left over, i.e. the positive
difference between the highest executable order volume ΦV (PXetra) = Vmax and
the aggregation of the order volume realized prior to bid i. Thus, the maximum
feasible quantity for bid i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , I} is given by:
L¯
D
i (PXetra) := max
{
0,ΦV (PXetra)−
ιd(i)−1∑
m=0
L
D
ι−1
d
(m)
(PXetra)
}
, (1.13)
where ι−1d (m) denotes the index of the bid in positionm of the execution sequence.
If the individual demand LDi (PXetra) of bid i is no greater than L¯
D
i (PXetra), then
bid i is fully realized. The final transaction of bid i is thus LDi (PXetra). If
L
D
i (PXetra) is greater than L¯
D
i (PXetra), bid i can only be partially executed. The
final transaction is thus L¯Di (PXetra) and bid i is rationed. We denote the final
transaction of bid i as:
XDi (PXetra) := min
{
L
D
i (PXetra), L¯
D
i (PXetra)
}
, i = 0, 1, . . . , I. (1.14)
In the supply side, the maximum feasible quantity for ask j ∈ {0, 1,. . . , J} is
the positive difference between the highest executable order volume ΦV (PXetra)
2FCFS is sometimes called First In First Out (FIFO).
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= Vmax and the aggregation of the order volume realized prior to ask j. The
maximum feasible quantity for ask j is given by:
L¯
S
j (PXetra) = max
{
0,ΦV (PXetra)−
ιs(j)−1∑
n=0
L
S
ι−1s (n)
(PXetra)
}
, (1.15)
where ι−1s (n) denotes the index of the ask in position n of the execution sequence.
We denote the final transaction of ask j as:
XSj (PXetra) := min
{
L
S
j (PXetra), L¯
S
j (PXetra)
}
, j = 0, 1, . . . , J. (1.16)
Xetra auction allocation mechanism is summarized as follows:
Theorem 1.2. Given the order book data set I0 in Assumption 1.1, if PXetra
exists, then the final transaction XDi (PXetra) for each bid i = 0, 1, . . . , I and
XSj (PXetra) for each ask j = 0, 1, . . . , J are stated as:

XDi (PXetra) = min
{
L
D
i (PXetra), L¯
D
i (PXetra)
}
, i = 0, 1, . . . , I;
XSj (PXetra) = min
{
L
S
j (PXetra), L¯
S
j (PXetra)
}
, j = 0, 1, . . . , J.
(1.17)
The allocation mechanism (1.17) implies that the aggregate final transaction of
bids is equal to the aggregate final transaction of asks in Xetra auction with
I∑
i=0
XDi (PXetra) =
J∑
j=0
XSj (PXetra) = ΦV (PXetra) = Vmax.
The market-clearing situation is included in Xetra auction allocation mechanism
as a special case where all orders are fully executed with

XDi (PXetra) = L
D
i (PXetra), i = 0, 1, . . . , I;
XSj (PXetra) = L
S
j (PXetra), j = 0, 1, . . . , J.
(1.18)
1.3.2 Properties of Xetra Auction Allocation Mechanism
Xetra auction allocation mechanism satisfies some well-known properties of ra-
tioning mechanisms which are allocation mechanisms under the assumption of
fixed market prices, see Benassy (1982) or Bo¨hm (1989) for more details.
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Voluntary exchange. The property of voluntary exchange states that no
trader is forced to trade more than that she claims. Intuitively, this property
holds for Xetra auction by the definition of Xetra order specifications. More for-
mally, the allocation mechanism (1.17) satisfies such property because for all bids
i and all asks j,
XDi (PXetra) ≤ L
D
i (PXetra),
XSj (PXetra) ≤ L
S
j (PXetra).
The short-side rule. According to Benassy (1982), the ‘short’ side of a market
is the market side where the aggregate trading volume is the smallest. It is thus
the demand side if there is excess supply in the market and vice versa. The other
side is called the ‘long’ side.
An allocation mechanism is called ‘efficient’ or frictionless if no mutually ad-
vantageous trade can be carried out from the transaction attained. This implies
that all traders on the short side will fully realize their claims.
Embedding with the property of voluntary exchange, we obtain the so-called
‘short-side rule’ which states that all traders on the short side will fully realize
their individual demand (supply). The allocation mechanism (1.17) satisfies the
short-side rule if
ΦD(PXetra) ≥ ΦS(PXetra) ⇒ X
S
j (PXetra) = L
S
j (PXetra), ∀j; (1.19)
ΦD(PXetra) ≤ ΦS(PXetra) ⇒ X
D
i (PXetra) = L
D
i (PXetra), ∀i. (1.20)
Clearly, ΦD(PXetra) ≥ ΦS(PXetra) implies ΦV (PXetra) = ΦS(PXetra) and hence
L¯
S
j (PXetra) = ΦS(PXetra)−
ιs(j)−1∑
n=0
L
S
ι−1s (n)
(PXetra) ≥ L
S
j (PXetra), j = 0, 1, . . . , J,
which implies that (1.19) holds. Analogous argument holds for (1.20).
Manipulability. An allocation mechanism is called non-manipulable in quan-
tity if the final transaction of a trader, when she is rationed, faces a bound which
depends solely on quoted quantities of other traders that she can not manipu-
late. It is called manipulable in quantity if the trader can, when she is rationed,
increase her final transaction by increasing the quoted quantity. Intuitively, non-
manipulability implies that the quantity quoted by a trader has no impact on her
maximum feasible quantity and vice versa.
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Order specifications in Xetra auction face upper bounds L¯Di (PXetra) and L¯
S
j (PXetra)
for their final transactions, should they be rationed. In the case of excess demand
with ΦD(PXetra) > ΦS(PXetra), only bids are rationed. The maximum feasible
quantity of bid i is
L¯
D
i (PXetra) = max
{
0,ΦS(PXetra)−
ιd(i)−1∑
m=0
L
D
ι−1
d
(m)
(PXetra)
}
, i = 0, 1, . . . , I;
which is independent of its individual quantity LDi (PXetra).
Analogously, only asks are rationed in the case of excess supply with ΦS(PXetra) >
ΦD(PXetra). The maximum feasible quantity of ask j is
L¯
S
j (PXetra) = max
{
0,ΦD(PXetra)−
ιs(j)−1∑
n=0
L
S
ι−1s (n)
(PXetra)
}
, j = 0, 1, . . . , J ;
which is independent of its individual quantity LSj (PXetra).
It appears at first sight that this observation implies that the allocation mech-
anism is non-manipulable in the sense of classical rationing theory. However,
traders do influence Xetra auction price through their order specifications. Hence,
the situation in Xetra auction is more complicated than that in classical rationing
theory in which prices are presumably fixed. To attain a profound understanding
of the property of manipulability in Xetra auction, one has to further investigate
the relationship between individual order specifications and Xetra auction price,
which is carried out later in Chapter 3.
In this chapter we have established formal models for Xetra auction price mech-
anism and the allocation mechanism, which shed light on the future research on
the market microstructure of multi-unit double auction and provide some hints
on how to formalize market mechanisms in other auction markets of electronic
security trading systems, e.g. Shanghai (2006) and Shenzhen (2006).
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Chapter 2
Improvement on Auction Price Mechanism
This chapter analyzes the properties of Xetra auction price mechanism and
presents an improvement on Xetra auction pricing rules from the perspective
of market efficiency which concerns the trading price being market-clearing. Sec-
tion 2.1 investigates the properties of Xetra auction price mechanism. Section
2.2 develops an improvement on Xetra auction pricing rules.
2.1 Properties of Xetra Auction Price Mecha-
nism
In conventional microeconomic literature, e.g. Pindyck & Rubinfeld (2001), the
aggregate demand and the aggregate supply schedule are represented by continu-
ous curves in the price-quantity space. The market price and the trading volume
are determined by the intersection point of the demand curve and the supply
curve. The continuity of these two curves ensures that the market price has the
property of the highest trading volume and zero surplus simultaneously. The
market price of this type is called market-clearing in the sense that the quantity
supplied is equal to the quantity demanded, i.e. zero surplus.
Compared with the conventional benchmark of equilibrium market system, the
aggregate demand function and the aggregate supply function in Xetra auction
market are step functions which are discontinuous. As stated in Gruppe Deutsche
Bo¨rse (2003), Xetra auction price mechanism follows two principles to determine
Xetra auction price:
1. The auction price is associated with the highest executable order volume;
2. The auction price is associated with the lowest surplus.
These two principles ensure Xetra auction to achieve an auction price close to
market-clearing but cannot rule out the possibility of a non market-clearing trad-
ing price. We thus obtain the first property of Xetra auction price mechanism as
follows:
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Property 2.1 (Existence of non market-clearing price). Xetra auction price is
generically non market-clearing.
The property of non market-clearing price implies that the ‘real’ Xetra market
may not be Pareto efficient all the time. This property exists not only in Xetra
auction but also in another electronic security trading platform Euronext, see
(Euronext 2006, p. 42). Trading rules stipulated in Shanghai (2006) and Shen-
zhen (2006) also imply that auction market prices in these two biggest security
markets in China are generically non market-clearing. Thus, one should con-
sider the potential effect of non market-clearing trading price when conducting
economic investigation based on ‘real’ Xetra system or other financial market
systems which share the same property; e.g. when empirically testing the effi-
cient market hypothesis (EMH) in Xetra auction market under the assumption
of market-clearing price.
Apart from the reference price Pref , Xetra auction price mechanism only considers
limit prices for possible auction price. This reflects that Xetra is an order-driven
system such that limit prices submitted by traders are the main driving factors
of Xetra auction price determination. On the other hand, the restriction on
considering only limit prices in Xetra auction price mechanism excludes the pos-
sibility of a market-clearing trading price whenever there exists a market-clearing
price but not a limit price. This can be seen from the following example which
corresponds to Example 4 in Gruppe Deutsche Bo¨rse (2003).
Price
Quantity
ΦD(p) ΦS(p)
100
200
0
198 199 200 201 202 203
Figure 2.1: Crossed order book in Example 2.1.
2.2. IMPROVEMENT ON AUCTION PRICING RULES 27
Example 2.1. Consider an order book with one market order for buying 100
shares, another market order for selling 100 shares, one bid order with the price-
quantity pair (199, 100), and one ask order with the price-quantity pair (202, 100).
The order book situation is shown in Figure 2.1.
In this example we have Ω0 = {199, 202} 6= ∅. The highest executable or-
der volume is Vmax = 100 and the set of volume maximizing prices is ΩV =
{199, 202}. The lowest surplus is Zmin = 100 and the set of candidate prices is
ΩZ = {199, 202}. Since there is surplus on the demand side as well as on the
supply side, Xetra auction applies Rule 2.4 which leads to PXetra = 200 when
Pref = 200, PXetra = 202 when Pref = 203, and PXetra = 199 when Pref = 198.
As readily seen from Figure 2.1, any price p ∈ (199, 202) is a market-clearing price
but not a limit price. Only when the reference price Pref ∈ (199, 202) could Xetra
auction price be market-clearing since then PXetra = Pref . Market equilibrium
could be obtained, for example, by taking the midpoint of the interval (199, 202)
as Xetra auction price with PXetra = 201.5. Xetra auction pricing rules exclude
the possibility of market-clearing by not taking into account prices other than
limit prices. This observation leads to the following property.
Property 2.2 (Limitation of limit prices). Xetra auction price mechanism ex-
cludes a market-clearing price but not a limit price from being Xetra auction
price.
We consider in this work the market efficiency of Xetra auction market as
Xetra auction price being market-clearing. Property 2.2 implies that it is possible
to select a market-clearing price but not a limit price as Xetra auction price
by modifying the restriction of considering only limit prices in Xetra auction
pricing rules. This modification on auction pricing rules, when it is possible, is an
improvement on the market efficiency of Xetra auction market. We regard these
modified auction pricing rules as improved auction pricing rules (improved
rules in short).
2.2 Improvement on Auction Pricing Rules
We take a brief review on the price determination process of Xetra auction.
Without loss of generality, we follow the order book data set I0 in Assumption
1.1 when the call phase ends. Xetra auction determines Xetra auction price PXetra
according to the data set I0. When there exists at least one limit price for Ω0 6= ∅
28 CHAPTER 2. IMPROVEMENT ON AUCTION PRICE MECHANISM
with a postive highest executable order volume for Vmax > 0, Xetra auction takes
the following steps to compute Xetra auction price PXetra:
1. COMPUTE: the set of all volume maximizing prices ΩV ;
2. COMPUTE: the lowest surplus Zmin in ΩV ;
3. COMPUTE: the set of all candidate prices with the highest executable order
volume and with the lowest surplus ΩZ ;
4. COMPUTE: the highest candidate price PZ ;
5. COMPUTE: the lowest candidate price PZ ;
6. SELECT: a unique auction price as PXetra according to Theorem 1.1.
The step functional form of trading volume function ΦV (p) and the non-increasing
excess demand function ΦZ(p) suggest that we can start directly from ΩV and
apply a new set of auction pricing rules to choose an auction price which is equal
to the auction price that Xetra auction pricing rules choose under the same order
book data set I0. We call this new set of auction pricing rules as equivalent
auction pricing rules (equivalent rules in short).
2.2.1 Equivalent Auction Pricing Rules
Starting from the order book data set I0 in Assumption 1.1, equivalent rules
consider all limit prices in Ω0. When there is no limit price in the order book
with Ω0 = ∅, equivalent rules choose the reference price Pref as the auction price
when market orders exist in both sides with d0 > 0 and s0 > 0. There is no
auction price when market orders do not exist on both sides.
When there exists limit prices in the order book with Ω0 6= ∅, equivalent rules
compute the highest executable order volume Vmax for all limit prices. No auction
price exists in equivalent rules when Vmax = 0.
When Vmax > 0, equivalent rules compute the set of all volume maximizing
prices ΩV . Define the highest volume maximizing price and the lowest volume
maximizing price as
PV := maxΩV and PV := minΩV .
Equivalent rules then choose a unique auction price Pequate from ΩV as follows:
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When there is only one volume maximizing price with ♯ΩV = 1, the unique
volume maximizing price is chosen as the auction price Pequate = PV = PV .
The excess demand function ΦZ(p) is non-increasing. Thus, when there is more
than one volume maximizing price with ♯ΩV > 1, there are four possibilities
by considering the surplus on the highest volume maximizing price PV and the
surplus on the lowest volume maximizing price PV .
CASE 1: ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) ≥ 0, i.e. all volume maximizing prices are
either with a surplus on the demand side or with no surplus and there is at least
one volume maximizing price with a surplus on the demand side. The highest
volume maximizing price which corresponds to the lowest surplus in ΩV is then
chosen as the auction price Pequate = PV .
CASE 2: ΦZ(PV ) ≤ 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0, i.e. all volume maximizing prices
are either with a surplus on the supply side or with no surplus and there is at
least one volume maximizing price with a surplus on the supply side. The lowest
volume maximizing price which corresponds to the lowest surplus in ΩV is then
chosen as the auction price Pequate = PV .
CASE 3: ΦZ(PV ) = 0 and ΦZ(PV ) = 0, i.e. all volume maximizing prices are
with no surplus. The reference price Pref is introduced to compare with the high-
est volume maximizing price PV and the lowest volume maximizing price PV . The
auction price is the highest volume maximizing price when the reference price is
higher than the highest volume maximizing price. The auction price is the lowest
volume maximizing price when the reference price is lower than the lowest vol-
ume maximizing price. The auction price is the reference price when the reference
price lies between the lowest volume maximizing price and the highest volume
maximizing price. Thus the auction price is Pequate = max{PV ,min{Pref , PV }}.
CASE 4: ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0, i.e. some volume maximizing prices
are with a surplus on the demand side and others with a surplus on the supply
side. Define the upper bound volume maximizing price P
′
max as the lowest
volume maximizing price with a surplus on the supply side and the lower bound
volume maximizing price P
′
min as the highest volume maximizing price with
a surplus on the demand side. There are three possibilities when comparing the
surplus of the upper bound volume maximizing price P
′
max with the surplus of
the lower bound volume maximizing price P
′
min:
(a) If the surplus of the lower bound volume maximizing price is less than the
surplus of the upper bound volume maximizing price, the auction price is
the lower bound volume maximizing price with Pequate = P
′
min;
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(b) If the surplus of the lower bound volume maximizing price is greater than
the surplus of the upper bound volume maximizing price, the auction price
is the upper bound volume maximizing price with Pequate = P
′
max;
(c) If the surplus of the lower bound volume maximizing price is equal to the
surplus of the upper bound volume maximizing price, the reference price Pref
is introduced and the auction price is Pequate = max{P
′
min,min{Pref , P
′
max}}.
Formulate the upper bound volume maximizing price P
′
max and the lower bound
volume maximizing price P
′
min as:
P
′
max := min {p ∈ ΩV | ΦZ(p) < 0}
P
′
min := max {p ∈ ΩV | ΦZ(p) > 0}. (2.1)
P
′
max and P
′
min are well defined in CASE 4. One property of P
′
min and P
′
max is
stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. When ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0, P
′
max > P
′
min is satisfied and
no limit price P ∗ ∈ (P
′
min, P
′
max) exists.
Proof. P
′
max > P
′
min holds since ΦZ(p) is non-increasing and ΦZ(P
′
max) < 0 <
ΦZ(P
′
min). By contradiction, assume there exists a limit price P
∗ ∈ (P
′
min, P
′
max).
Then it must be with ΦZ(P
∗) = 0 and ΦV (P
∗) = Vmax, which implies that
ΦD(P
∗) = ΦS(P
∗) = Vmax. Since ΦZ(P
′
min) > 0 and ΦZ(P
′
max) < 0, we have
ΦS(P
′
min) = ΦD(P
′
max) = Vmax. ΦD(P
∗) = ΦD(P
′
max) = Vmax implies that P
∗ is
not a limit bid price and ΦS(P
′
min) = ΦS(P
∗) = Vmax implies that P
∗ is not a
limit ask price. Thus, there exists no limit price P ∗ ∈ (P
′
min, P
′
max).
The price determination process for equivalent rules is depicted in the form of
flowchart in Appendix B. We formalize equivalent auction pricing rules in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Given the order book data set I0 in Assumption 1.1, equivalent
auction pricing rules determine a unique auction price Pequate whenever it is
possible.
If Ω0 6= ∅ and Vmax > 0, then Pequate exists and is determined as follows:
(I. ) If ♯ΩV = 1, then Pequate = PV = PV .
(II.) If ♯ΩV > 1, then
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(II.I ) if ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) ≥ 0, then Pequate = PV ;
(II.II ) if ΦZ(PV ) ≤ 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0, then Pequate = PV ;
(II.III) if ΦZ(PV ) = ΦZ(PV ) = 0, then Pequate = max{PV ,min{Pref , PV }};
(II.IV) otherwise,
Pequate =


P
′
min, when |ΦZ(P
′
min)| < |ΦZ(P
′
max)|;
P
′
max, when |ΦZ(P
′
min)| > |ΦZ(P
′
max)|;
max{P
′
min,min{Pref , P
′
max}}, when |ΦZ(P
′
min)| = |ΦZ(P
′
max)|;
where PV = maxΩV , PV = minΩV , and P
′
max = min{p ∈ ΩV | ΦZ(p) < 0} with
P
′
min = max{p ∈ ΩV | ΦZ(p) > 0}.
If only market orders exist such that Ω0 = ∅ with d0 > 0 and s0 > 0, then the
auction price is Pequate = Pref .
Otherwise, the auction price Pequate remains unspecified.
Proof. When there exists only one volume maximizing price with ♯ΩV = 1, the
auction price is the unique volume maximizing price with Pequate = PV = PV ,
which corresponds to (I) in this theorem.
The four cases in (II) correspond to the four cases when there is more than
one volume maximizing price with ♯ΩV > 1. CASE 1 with ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and
ΦZ(PV ) ≥ 0 corresponds to (II.I) in the theorem. The auction price in this
case is the highest volume maximizing price with Pequate = PV . CASE 2 with
ΦZ(PV ) ≤ 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0 corresponds to (II.II) in the theorem. The auction
price in this case is Pequate = PV . CASE 3 corresponding to (II.III) in the theorem
implies that the auction price Pequate = max{PV ,min{Pref , PV }} when all volume
maximizing prices have no surplus with ΦZ(PV ) = 0 and ΦZ(PV ) = 0. CASE
4 corresponds to (II.IV) in the theorem, referring to the case that some volume
maximizing prices have a surplus on the demand side whereas others have a
surplus on the supply side with ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0. In this case,
equivalent rules introduce the upper bound volume maximizing price P
′
max and
the lower bound volume maximizing price P
′
min. When the surplus of P
′
min is
less than that of P
′
max, the auction price is Pequate = P
′
min which is with lower
surplus. When the surplus of P
′
min is greater than that of P
′
max, the auction
price is Pequate = P
′
max which is with lower surplus. When the surplus of P
′
min is
equal to that of P
′
max, the reference price Pref is included and the auction price is
Pequate = max{P
′
min,min{Pref , P
′
max}}.
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Equivalent rules choose the reference price as the auction price Pequate = Pref
when only market orders exist on both market sides for d0 > 0 and s0 > 0 with
Ω0 = ∅. No auction price Pequate is specified when all other rules fail.
The equivalence between the auction price Pequate chosen by equivalent rules and
Xetra auction price PXetra chosen by Xetra auction pricing rules is stated formally
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Given the same order book data set I0 in Assumption 1.1, the
auction price Pequate determined by Theorem 2.1 is equal to Xetra auction price
PXetra determined by Theorem 1.1.
The complete proof of Proposition 2.1 is presented in Appendix C. We demon-
strate the equivalence of Pequate and PXetra in the following example.
Example 2.2. Consider the same order book as in Example 1.1 containing three
bid orders with price-quantity pairs (198, 100), (200, 100), and (201, 150). It also
contains one ask order with the price-quantity pair (199, 100). The order book
situation is shown in Figure 2.2.
Price
Quantity
ΦD(p)
ΦS(p)
100
150
250
350
0
198 199 200 201 202 203
Figure 2.2: Crossed order book in Example 2.2.
In this example, equivalent rules determine Pequate by employing the following
steps: Since Ω0 = {198, 199, 200, 201} 6= ∅, equivalent rules compute Vmax = 100.
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Since Vmax = 100 > 0, equivalent rules compute the set of all volume maximizing
prices ΩV = {199, 200, 201}. The highest volume maximizing price is PV = 201
and the lowest volume maximizing price is PV = 199. Since ♯ΩV > 1, equivalent
rules investigate ΦZ(PV ) = 50 > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) = 150 > 0. (II.I) in theorem 2.1
is thus applied and the auction price is Pequate = PV = 201, which is equal to
Xetra auction price PXetra = 201 shown in Example 1.1.
2.2.2 Improved Auction Pricing Rules
As stated in Property 2.2, Xetra auction pricing rules eliminate the possibility of
choosing a market-clearing price but not a limit price as Xetra auction price. It
leaves us space to attain an improvement from the perspective of market efficiency
in Xetra auction market by relaxing the restriction of considering only limit prices.
We achieve this improvement by modifying equivalent rules.
Considering each case in equivalent rules, we find out that a market-clearing price
but not a limit price exists only when there is more than one volume maximizing
price for some volume maximizing prices with a surplus on the demand side
and others with a surplus on the supply side; i.e. CASE 4 of ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and
ΦZ(PV ) < 0. We thus obtain improved rules by modifying the pricing rule in
CASE 4 while inheriting all other pricing rules from equivalent rules.
For the case of ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0, consider the upper bound volume
maximizing price P
′
max and the lower bound volume maximizing price P
′
min as
formulated in equation (2.1). Any price lying between P
′
max and P
′
min is a market-
clearing price.
Lemma 2.2. When ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0, any price p ∈ (P
′
min, P
′
max) is
a market-clearing price.
Proof. To prove any p ∈ (P
′
min, P
′
max) is a market-clearing price is to prove
ΦZ(p) = 0 for any p ∈ (P
′
min, P
′
max). ΦZ(p) is non-increasing, thus any price
p > P
′
min is with ΦZ(p) ≤ 0 by definition of P
′
min and any price p < P
′
max is with
ΦZ(p) ≥ 0 by definition of P
′
max. Therefore, ΦZ(p) = 0 for p ∈ (P
′
min, P
′
max).
Lemma 2.2 together with Lemma 2.1 implies that any price p ∈ (P
′
min, P
′
max) is a
market-clearing price but not a limit price when ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0.
Denote the auction price determined by improved rules as Pimpr. We choose in
improved rules the mid price of the upper bound volume maximizing price P
′
max
34 CHAPTER 2. IMPROVEMENT ON AUCTION PRICE MECHANISM
and the lower bound volume maximizing price P
′
min as the auction price with
Pimpr =
1
2
(P
′
min + P
′
max). The case of ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0 in improved
rules is stated as follows:
CASE 4′: ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0, i.e. some volume maximizing prices
are with a surplus on the demand side and others with a surplus on the supply
side. The mid price of the upper bound volume maximizing price P
′
max and the
lower bound volume maximizing price P
′
min is chosen as the auction price with
Pimpr =
1
2
(P
′
min + P
′
max).
The price determination process for improved rules is depicted in the form of
flowchart in Appendix B. The formalization of improved auction pricing rules is
presented as follows.
Theorem 2.2. Given the order book data set I0 in Assumption 1.1, improved
auction pricing rules determine a unique auction price Pimpr whenever it is pos-
sible.
If Ω0 6= ∅ and Vmax > 0, then Pimpr exists and is determined as follows:
(I. ) If ♯ΩV = 1, then Pimpr = PV = PV .
(II.) If ♯ΩV > 1, then
(II.I ) if ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) ≥ 0, then Pimpr = PV ;
(II.II ) if ΦZ(PV ) ≤ 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0, then Pimpr = PV ;
(II.III) if ΦZ(PV ) = ΦZ(PV ) = 0, then Pimpr = max{PV ,min{Pref , PV }};
(II.IV) otherwise, Pimpr =
1
2
(P
′
min + P
′
max);
where PV = maxΩV , PV = minΩV , and P
′
max = min{p ∈ ΩV | ΦZ(p) < 0} with
P
′
min = max{p ∈ ΩV | ΦZ(p) > 0}.
If only market orders exist such that Ω0 = ∅ with d0 > 0 and s0 > 0, then the
auction price is Pimpr = Pref .
Otherwise, the auction price Pimpr remains unspecified.
Proof. Improved rules only differ from equivalent rules in the case of ΦZ(PV ) >
0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0, which corresponds to case (II.IV) in theorem 2.1. Thus we
obtain this theorem by considering Pimpr =
1
2
(P
′
min + P
′
max) in case (II.IV) while
inheriting all other cases from theorem 2.1.
The following example illustrates the improvement on market efficiency when
applying improved rules to determine auction price in Xetra auction market.
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Example 2.3. Consider the order book containing two bid orders with price-
quantity pairs (200, 100) and (202, 150). It also contains two ask orders with
price-quantity pairs (199, 150) and (201, 150). The order book situation is shown
in Figure 2.3.
Price
Quantity
ΦD(p)
ΦS(p)
150
250
300
0
198 199 200 201 202 203
Figure 2.3: Crossed order book in Example 2.3.
In this example, improved rules determine Pimpr by employing the following steps:
Since Ω0 = {199, 200, 201, 202} 6= ∅, improved rules compute Vmax = 150. Since
Vmax = 150 > 0, improved rules further compute the set of all volume maximizing
prices ΩV = {199, 200, 201, 202}. The highest volume maximizing price is PV =
202 and the lowest volume maximizing price is PV = 199. Since ♯ΩV > 1,
improved rules compute ΦZ(PV ) = 100 > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) = −150 < 0. Thus,
improved rules compute P
′
min = 200 and P
′
max = 201. Case (II.IV) in Theorem
2.2 is applied and the auction price is Pimpr =
1
2
(P
′
min + P
′
max) = 200.5, which is
a market-clearing price since ΦZ(200.5) = 0.
Equivalent rules compute P
′
min = 200 and P
′
max = 201 in this case. Since
|ΦZ(200)| < |ΦZ(201)|, Pequate = P
′
min = 200 is chosen as the auction price by
equivalent rules. The Xetra auction price is PXetra = Pequate = 200 in this exam-
ple according to Proposition 2.1. PXetra = Pequate = 200 is not a market-clearing
price since the excess demand ΦZ(200) = 100 6= 0.
This example verifies that Xetra auction market can be improved from the per-
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spective of market efficiency when adopting improved rules to determine the
auction price in the market. The following proposition formalizes this finding.
Proposition 2.2. There exists improvement on market efficiency when Xetra
auction market replace Xetra auction pricing rules depicted in Theorem 1.1 with
improved pricing rules depicted in Theorem 2.2 to determine the auction price.
Proof. Compare Theorem 2.2 with Theorem 2.1, the difference only lies in the
case of ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0, which is case (II.IV) for both theorems.
Lemma 2.2 implies that Theorem 2.2 always selects a market-clearing price while
Lemma 2.1 implies that Theorem 2.1 does not always choose a market-clearing
price as the auction price in this case. Proposition 2.1 verifies the equivalence of
auction price on Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 2.1. This equivalence implies that
an improvement on market efficiency exists when Xetra auction market applies
Theorem 2.2 instead of Theorem 1.1 to determine the auction price.
In this chapter we have investigated the properties of Xetra auction price mech-
anism and have developed equivalent auction pricing rules and improved auction
pricing rules which are derived from Xetra auction pricing rules. Equivalent auc-
tion pricing rules can be regarded as an equivalence of Xetra auction pricing
rules in the sense that it attains the same auction price as Xetra auction pricing
rules given the same order book data set. Improved auction pricing rules can be
regarded as an improvement on Xetra auction pricing rules from the perspective
of market efficiency. These two sets of auction pricing rules can be served as
a reference when modifying Xetra auction pricing rules as well as auction pric-
ing rules in other electronic security trading systems such as NGTS in Shanghai
Stock Exchange of China.
Chapter 3
Investment Decision in Xetra auction
market
Xetra auction market mechanism determines the trading price and the trading
volume given the order book that is an aggregation of orders submitted by traders.
This implies that the trading price and the final transaction volume are dependent
on the order specification that the trader submits. The trader is thus not in the
type of price takers who believe their trading behavior has no impact on the
market. This triggers us to explicitly consider in the trader’s investment decision
the impact of the order submitted by the trader on the current Xetra auction
price and the final transaction volume.
3.1 Security Trading Process
We consider an economy containing one risk-free asset market and one risky asset
market with a consumption commodity regarded as the numeraire. The economy
contains no transaction cost and no short-sale constraint.
The risk-free asset is divisible in any trading quantity with the trading price
normalized to 1. It has a constant interest factor R > 0 which can be interpreted
as 1+ r with r denoting the nominal interest rate. The risky asset market trades
only integer shares, e.g. traders can trade 19 shares but not 19.81 shares in the
risky asset market. The risky asset market is a Xetra auction market which is
assumed to hold one Xetra auction for each trading period. Xetra auction market
mechanism depicted in chapter 1 is applied to determine the trading price and
the final transaction volume of the market.
We consider the trader’s investment decision in one trading period. Assume that
at the beginning of the trading period the trader obtains an initial endowment
(y0, Z0) with y0 shares of the risk-free asset and Z0 shares of the risky asset. The
trader observes trading information from markets and performs its investment
decision to decide the order specification Os to submit to Xetra auction market
in the call phase. Xetra auction market mechanism collects order specifications
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submitted by traders into a central order book during the call phase and calcu-
lates in the price determination phase the Xetra auction price PX and the final
transaction volume ZX for the trader given the central order book. Xetra auction
price PX is dependent on the order specification Os that the trader submits and
can be interpreted as Xetra auction price function PX(Os). Correspondingly,
the final transaction volume can be interpreted as Xetra auction allocation
function ZX(Os). After trading the risky asset, the trader participates in the
risk-free asset market and attains the trading quantity y of the risk-free asset.
The trader then obtains the portfolio holding (y0 + y, Z0+ ZX(Os)) which is the
combination of the risk-free asset and the risky asset. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
trader’s security trading process.
Risk-free asset
trading: y
Initial endowment: (y0, Z0)
Order Os
Portfolio holding after trading: (y0 + y, Z0 + ZX(Os))
(
PX(Os)
ZX(Os)
)
Xetra auction
market
Figure 3.1: Trader’s security trading process.
The trader in Xetra auction market has the knowledge on how Xetra auction
market mechanism determines the trading price and the final transaction volume
given the order book. It observes the real-time trading data in the market and
considers in its investment decision the subjective forecast P eX(Os) on Xetra auc-
tion price function PX(Os) and the forecast Z
e
X(Os) on Xetra auction allocation
function ZX(Os). We assume that the order book in Xetra auction market is
transparent to the trader during the call phase.1 We further assume that the
order book is in the following form:
Assumption 3.1. The trader obtains the real-time data of the complete order
book in the form of:
I0 = {d0, (a1, d1), . . . , (aI , dI); s0, (b1, s1), . . . , (bJ , sJ);Pref} (3.1)
1Currently the order book in the call phase of the auction is only partially open in Xetra
platform operated in Deutsche Bo¨rse, but it is open with full order book depth in Xetra platform
operated in Wiener Bo¨rse, see Wiener Bo¨rse (2006).
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with d0 denoting the market bid order, (a1, d1), . . . , (aI , dI) denoting I limit bid
orders with aI > . . . > a2 > a1, s0 denoting the market ask order, (b1, s1), . . .,
(bJ , sJ) denoting J limit ask orders with bJ > . . . > b2 > b1, and Pref denoting
the current reference price in Xetra auction market.
Xetra auction market allows two basic types of order specifications: limit orders
and market orders. For simplicity, we assume that the trader submits only market
orders. For convenience of the notation, we regard Qm > 0 to denote a market
bid order and Qm < 0 to denote a market ask order. The following assumption
is made to further simplify the analysis.
Assumption 3.2. The trader is the last one who submits the order specification
in the call phase.
Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, the trader constructs its subjective expectations
on Xetra auction price and the final transaction volume which coincide with
the ‘real’ Xetra auction price and the final transaction volume, i.e. P eX(Qm) =
PX(Qm) and Z
e
X(Qm) = ZX(Qm). Our work start from deriving the explicit form
of PX(Qm) and ZX(Qm).
3.2 Xetra Auction Price and Allocation
The formulation of Xetra auction price function and the allocation function re-
quires the explicit form of excess demand function ΦZ(p). We denote the aggre-
gate demand function as ΦD(p) and the aggregate supply function as ΦS(p) for
the order book data set I0 in Assumption 3.1. The excess demand function is
defined as ΦZ(p) := ΦD(p)− ΦS(p).
There are I + J limit prices in I0. Let Ω0 = {a1, . . . , aI , b1, . . . , bJ} denote the
set of all limit prices in I0 and rearrange all these limit prices in Ω0 such that
P1 ≤ P2 ≤ · · · ≤ PI+J for Pi ∈ Ω0 with i = 1, . . . , I + J .
We introduce a new notation “
[]
” to represent a closed half or an open half of an
interval. For example,
[]
a, b
[]
= [a, b] , [a, b) , (a, b] , or (a, b) with a < b. With
the rearrangement of limit prices and the new notation “
[]
”, the explicit form of
ΦZ(p) is stated as follows:
Lemma 3.1. Given the order book data set I0 in Assumption 3.1, rearrange
all the limit prices in I0 such that P1 ≤ P2 ≤ · · · ≤ PI+J , then the excess demand
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function ΦZ(p) is a non-increasing step function and takes the form:
ΦZ(p) =
I+J∑
n=0
φZn1AZn (p), (3.2)
where φZn is a constant for n = 0, . . . , I+J and {A
Z
0 , A
Z
1 , . . . , A
Z
I+J} is a partition
of R+ with A
Z
0 := [0, P1
[]
; AZn :=
[]
Pn, Pn+1
[]
for n = 1, . . . , I + J − 1; and
AZI+J :=
[]
PI+J ,+∞).
We illustrate the explicit form of excess demand function ΦZ(p) in the following
example.
Example 3.1. Consider the order book containing three bid orders with price-
quantity pairs (198, 100), (199, 100), and (202, 150). It also contains two ask
orders with price-quantity pairs (200, 50) and (201, 150). The reference price is
Pref = 200. The order book situation is shown in Figure 3.2.
Price
Quantity
ΦD(p)
ΦS(p)
0
50
150
200
250
350
198 199 200 201 202 203
Figure 3.2: Crossed order book in Example 3.1.
Rearrange limit prices in the order book such that P1 = 198, P2 = 199, P3 = 200,
P4 = 201, and P5 = 202. Calculate the values of φ
Z
0 = 350, φ
Z
1 = 250, φ
Z
2 = 150,
φZ3 = 100, φ
Z
4 = −50, and φ
Z
5 = −200. The excess demand function is shown in
3.2. XETRA AUCTION PRICE AND ALLOCATION 41
Figure 3.3, which takes the explicit form:
ΦZ(p) =


350 for p ∈ AZ0 ;
250 for p ∈ AZ1 ;
150 for p ∈ AZ2 ;
100 for p ∈ AZ3 ;
−50 for p ∈ AZ4 ;
−200 for p ∈ AZ5 ;
(3.3)
where {AZ0 , A
Z
1 , . . . , A
Z
5 } is a partition of R+ with A
Z
0 = [0, 198]; A
Z
1 = (198, 199];
AZ2 = (199, 200); A
Z
3 = [200, 201); A
Z
4 = [201, 202]; and A
Z
5 = (202,+∞). ΦZ(p)
is non-increasing since φZ0 > φ
Z
1 > φ
Z
2 > φ
Z
3 > φ
Z
4 > φ
Z
5 .
Price
Quantity
ΦZ(p)
100
150
250
350
0
-50
-200
198 199 200 201 202 203
Figure 3.3: Excess demand function ΦZ(p) for crossed order book in Example
3.1.
After the trader submits the market order Qm, the updated order book data set
is: I0 ∪ {Qm}. The new excess demand function denoted by Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) takes the
form:
Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) = ΦZ(p) +Qm
=
I+J∑
n=0
φZn1AZn (p) +Qm. (3.4)
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Φ
′
Z is increasing in Qm and non-increasing in p. By applying Lemma 3.1, we
further obtain a property for Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) as follows:
Property 3.1. For any arbitrary but fixed price p ∈ AZn , Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) = 0 if and
only if Qm = −φ
Z
n for some n = 0, 1, . . . , I + J .
3.2.1 Xetra Auction Price Function
The order book situation is sophisticated in general. It is insightful to first
investigate a simple case in order to get hints on how to derive Xetra auction
price function PX(Qm). Here we consider the case of uncrossed order book where
the aggregate demand does not overlap with the aggregate supply. We derive the
explicit form of Xetra auction price function PX(Qm) in the following example.
Example 3.2. Consider an uncrossed order book containing two bid orders with
price-quantity pairs (198, 100) and (199, 250). It also contains two ask orders with
price-quantity pairs (200, 50) and (201, 150). The reference price is Pref = 202.
The order book situation is shown in Figure 3.4.
Price
Quantity
ΦD(p)
ΦS(p)
0
50
200
250
350
198 199 200 201
Figure 3.4: Uncrossed order book in Example 3.2.
Limit prices in this order book are a1 = 198, a2 = 199, b1 = 200, and b2 = 201
with a1 < a2 < b1 < b2. Calculate the values of φ
Z
0 = α0 = 350, φ
Z
1 = α1 = 250,
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φZ2 = 0, φ
Z
3 = −β1 = −50, and φ
Z
4 = −β2 = −200. The corresponding excess
demand function that is shown in Figure 3.5 takes the explicit form:
ΦZ(p) =


350 for p ∈ AZ0 ;
250 for p ∈ AZ1 ;
0 for p ∈ AZ2 ;
−50 for p ∈ AZ3 ;
−200 for p ∈ AZ4 ;
(3.5)
where AZ0 = [0, 198], A
Z
1 = (198, 199], A
Z
2 = (199, 200), A
Z
3 = [200, 201), and
AZ4 = [201,+∞).
Price
Quantity
ΦZ(p)
250
350
0
-50
-200
198 199 200 201
Figure 3.5: Excess demand function ΦZ(p) for uncrossed order book in Example
3.2.
The quoted trading quantity Qm that the trader can choose to trade against the
excess demand ΦZ(p) is with Qm ∈ (−∞,+∞). ΦZ(p) in (3.5) has the values of
{−350,−250, 0, 50, 200}, which divide the range of Qm into:
{ (−∞,−350), (−350,−250), (−250, 0), (0, 50), (50, 200), (200,+∞) }. (3.6)
We consider the value of PX(Qm) for Qm in each interval of (3.6) and for Qm ∈
{−350,−250, 0, 50, 200}. We discover that Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) ≤ 0 holds for any price
p ∈ R+ when Qm ∈ (−∞,−350). This implies that the lowest limit price P1 =
198 is with the highest executable order volume and the lowest surplus. Thus,
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P1 = 198 is chosen as Xetra auction price when Qm ∈ (−∞,−350). Analogously,
Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) ≥ 0 holds for any price p ∈ R+ when Qm ∈ (200,+∞). This implies
that the highest limit price PI+J = 201 is with the highest executable order
volume and the lowest surplus. Thus, PI+J = 201 is chosen as Xetra auction
price when Qm ∈ (200,+∞).
Another discovery is that Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) = 0 for any price p ∈ [0, 198] when Qm =
−350. Only the limit price P1 = 198 is with the highest executable order volume
and with no surplus. Thus, P1 = 198 is chosen as Xetra auction price when
Qm = −350. Analogous results are obtained as Xetra auction price is PX = 199
when Qm = −250, PX = 200 when Qm = 50, and PX = 201 when Qm = 200. As
the order book is uncrossed, there is no Xetra auction price PX when the trader
does not submit a market order with Qm = 0.
Finally, we observe that Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) > 0 holds for any price p ∈ [0, 198] and that
Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) < 0 holds for any price p ∈ (198, 199] when Qm ∈ (−350,−250).
The limit price P1 = 198 is with the highest executable order volume and the
lowest surplus. Thus, P1 = 198 is chosen as Xetra auction price when Qm ∈
(−350,−250). Analogous results are obtained as Xetra auction price is PX = 199
when Qm ∈ (−250, 0), PX = 200 when Qm ∈ (0, 50), and PX = 191 when
Qm ∈ (50, 200). In summary, Xetra auction price function PX(Qm) takes the
explicit form:
PX(Qm) =


198 when Qm ∈ (−∞,−250);
199 when Qm ∈ [−250, 0);
200 when Qm ∈ (0, 50];
201 when Qm ∈ (50,+∞);
(3.7)
which is shown in Figure 3.6.
These findings discovered in Example 3.2 can be generalized to construct Xetra
auction price function PX(Qm), which is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Given the order book data set I0 in Assumption 3.1 and the
explicit form of ΦZ(p) from Lemma 3.1, Xetra auction price function PX(Qm)
which is a non-decreasing step function takes the form:
PX(Qm) =


P1 when Qm ∈ (−∞,−φ
Z
1 );
P ∗n when Qm = −φ
Z
n , n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I + J − 1};
Pn when Qm ∈ (−φ
Z
n−1,−φ
Z
n ), n ∈ {2, 3, . . . , I + J − 1};
PI+J when Qm ∈ (−φ
Z
I+J−1,+∞);
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Price
Quantity
PX(Qm)
500-250
198
199
200
201
Figure 3.6: Xetra auction price function PX(Qm) for uncrossed order book in
Example 3.2.
where for any n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , I + J − 1},
P ∗n =


Pn CASE 1;
Pn+1 CASE 2;
max{Pn,min{Pref , Pn+1}} CASE 3;
(3.8)
for CASE 1: either AZn = [Pn, Pn+1) or A
Z
n = (Pn, Pn+1) with
|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn) |<|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn+1) |;
for CASE 2: either AZn = (Pn, Pn+1] or A
Z
n = (Pn, Pn+1) with
|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn) |>|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn+1) |;
for CASE 3: either AZn = [Pn, Pn+1] or A
Z
n = (Pn, Pn+1) with
|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn) |=|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn+1) | .
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is presented in Appendix D. Here we briefly interpret
the construction of P ∗n in (3.8). According to Property 3.1, when Qm = −φ
Z
n for
n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I + J − 1}, the excess demand is with Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) = 0 for p ∈ A
Z
n .
AZn could be [Pn, Pn+1), (Pn, Pn+1], (Pn, Pn+1), or [Pn, Pn+1].
When AZn = [Pn, Pn+1), Pn is the only limit price associated with the highest
executable order volume and zero surplus. This case is considered in CASE 1
of (3.8), and Xetra auction price function takes the value of PX(Qm) = Pn.
Analogously, AZn = (Pn, Pn+1] is considered in CASE 2 of (3.8). Xetra auction
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price function takes the value of PX(Qm) = Pn+1, as Pn+1 is the only limit price
associated with the highest executable order volume and zero surplus in this case.
When AZn = (Pn, Pn+1), we compare the surplus of Pn with the surplus of Pn+1.
When Pn has lower surplus than Pn+1 with |Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn)| < |Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn+1)|,
which is considered in CASE 1 of (3.8), Xetra auction price function takes the
value of the limit price with the lower surplus as PX(Qm) = Pn. When Pn
has higher surplus than Pn+1 with |Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn)| > |Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn+1)|, which is
considered in CASE 2 of (3.8), Xetra auction price function takes the value of
the limit price with the lower surplus as PX(Qm) = Pn+1. When Pn has the same
surplus as Pn+1 with |Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn)| = |Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn+1)|, which is considered in
CASE 3 of (3.8), the reference price Pref is introduced and Xetra auction price
function takes the value of PX(Qm) = max{Pn,min{Pref , Pn+1}}.
AZn = [Pn, Pn+1] is considered in CASE 3 of (3.8). Both Pn and Pn+1 are associated
with the highest executable order volume and zero surplus in this case. The
reference price Pref is introduced and Xetra auction price function takes the value
of PX(Qm) = max{Pn,min{Pref , Pn+1}}.
We demonstrate how to apply Theorem 3.1 to compute Xetra auction price func-
tion PX(Qm) in the following example.
Example 3.3. Consider the order book situation depicted in Example 3.1. The
explicit form of excess demand function is described in (3.3) with P1 = 198,
P2 = 199, P3 = 200, P4 = 201, and P5 = 202; φ
Z
0 = 350, φ
Z
1 = 250, φ
Z
2 = 150,
φZ3 = 100, φ
Z
4 = −50, and φ
Z
5 = −200. The construction of Xetra auction price
function PX(Qm) is as follows:
For Qm ∈ (−∞,−φ
Z
1 ) = (−∞,−250), the value of Xetra auction price function
is PX(Qm) = P1 = 198 according to Theorem 3.1.
For Qm = −φ
Z
1 = −250, we obtain PX(Qm) = P2 = 199 when CASE 2 of (3.8)
is applied for AZ1 = (198, 199]. For Qm ∈ (−φ
Z
1 ,−φ
Z
2 ) = (−250,−150), we have
PX(Qm) = P2 = 199.
For Qm = −φ
Z
2 = −150, we obtain PX(Qm) = P3 = 200 when CASE 2 of (3.8) is
applied for AZ2 = (199, 200) with |Φ
′
Z(−150, 199)| = 100 > 50 = |Φ
′
Z(−150, 200)|.
For Qm ∈ (−φ
Z
2 ,−φ
Z
3 ) = (−150,−100), we have PX(Qm) = P3 = 200. For
Qm = −φ
Z
3 = −100, we obtain PX(Qm) = P3 = 200 when CASE 1 of (3.8) is
applied for AZ3 = [200, 201).
For Qm ∈ (−φ
Z
3 ,−φ
Z
4 ) = (−100, 50), we have PX(Qm) = P4 = 201. For Qm =
−φZ4 = 50, we obtain PX(Qm) = max{201,min{Pref , 202}} = 201 when CASE 3
of (3.8) is applied for AZ4 = [201, 202] with the reference price Pref = 200.
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For Qm ∈ (−φ
Z
4 ,+∞) = (50,+∞), we have PX(Qm) = P5 = 202. Thus the
explicit form of PX(Qm) is:
PX(Qm) =


198 when Qm ∈ (−∞,−250);
199 when Qm ∈ [−250,−150);
200 when Qm ∈ [−150,−100];
201 when Qm ∈ (−100, 50];
202 when Qm ∈ (50,+∞);
(3.9)
which is depicted in Figure 3.7.
Price
Quantity
PX(Qm)
500-100-150-250
198
199
200
201
202
Figure 3.7: Xetra auction price function PX(Qm) for crossed order book in Ex-
ample 3.1.
3.2.2 Xetra Auction Allocation Function
To get hints on how to construct Xetra auction allocation function ZX(Qm),
we investigate the case of an uncrossed order book and derive Xetra auction
allocation function in the following example.
Example 3.4. Consider the order book in Example 3.2. Observing from Figure
3.4, the maximum quantity that the trader would buy from the market is 200,
and the maximum quantity that the trader would sell to the market is 350. The
trader submits a market order Qm that has higher execution priorities than limit
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orders in Xetra auction market. Xetra auction allocation function ZX(Qm) thus
takes the explicit form:
ZX(Qm) = max{−350,min{Qm, 200}}; (3.10)
which is shown in Figure 3.8.
ZX(Qm)
ZX(Qm)
Qm200
200
−350
−350
0
Figure 3.8: Xetra auction allocation function ZX(Qm) for uncrossed order book
in Example 3.2.
One can obtain Xetra auction allocation function ZX(Qm) for general order book
situation by reconsidering the maximum trading quantities shown in (3.10). Con-
sider the trader trading against the order book depicted in Assumption 3.1 with
the explicit form of ΦZ(p) depicted in Lemma 3.1. The maximum quantity that
the trader’s market bid order Qm > 0 could realize is −φ
Z
I+J when the order
book has excess demand on the supply side with φZI+J < 0. The trader can not
realize its market bid order when all excess demands of the order book are on
the demand side with φZI+J ≥ 0. Introduce the notation of a
+ := max{0, a}
for a ∈ R. The maximum trading quantity for the market bid order Qm > 0
is thus (−φZI+J)
+. Similarly, the maximum trading quantity for the market ask
order Qm < 0 is (−φ
Z
0 )
− with the notation of a− := min{0, a}. Xetra auction
allocation function ZX(Qm) thus takes the explicit form as follows:
Theorem 3.2. Given the order book data set I0 in Assumption 3.1 with φ
Z
0 and
φZI+J from the explicit form of ΦZ(p) in Lemma 3.1, Xetra auction allocation
3.3. EXPECTED XETRA AUCTION PRICE AND ALLOCATION 49
function ZX(Qm) takes the form:
ZX(Qm) = max{(−φ
Z
0 )
−,min{Qm, (−φ
Z
I+J)
+}}. (3.11)
By applying Theorem 3.2, we obtain Xetra auction allocation function ZX(Qm)
in Example 3.1 as:
ZX(Qm) = max{(−φ
Z
0 )
−,min{Qm, (−φ
Z
I+J)
+}}
= max{−350,min{Qm, 200}},
which is depicted in Figure 3.9.
ZX(Qm)
ZX(Qm)
Qm200
200
−350
−350
0
Figure 3.9: Xetra auction allocation function ZX(Qm) for crossed order book in
Example 3.1.
3.3 Expected Xetra Auction Price and Alloca-
tion
We relax Assumption 3.2 and consider that the trader is not the last who sub-
mits the order specification. Under this circumstances, the trader constructs its
subjective expectations on Xetra auction price and the final transaction volume
which are not consistent with the ‘real’ Xetra auction price and the final trans-
action volume in general. The trader has to consider the uncertainty that there
might be orders entering the market after its market order Qm. For simplicity,
we assume:
50 CHAPTER 3. INVESTMENT DECISION
Assumption 3.3. The trader expects that other traders in the market submit
only market orders with the aggregate amount of QeD ≥ 0 market bid orders and
the aggregate amount of QeS ≤ 0 market ask orders after the trader submits its
market order Qm.
3.3.1 Expected Xetra Auction Price Function
Since Qm, Q
e
D, and Q
e
S are market orders, Xetra auction price mechanism treats
all market orders as one aggregated market orderQm+Q
e
D+Q
e
S when determining
Xetra auction price. Denote ∆Qe := QeD + Q
e
S. Thus, the trader’s subjective
expectation P eX(Qm) on Xetra auction price function is equivalent to PX(Qm +
∆Qe) where the explicit form of PX(·) is depicted in Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 3.1. Given Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 3.3, the trader’s sub-
jective expectation P eX(Qm) on Xetra auction price function is a non-decreasing
step function and takes the form:
P eX(Qm) =


P1 when Qm ∈ (−∞,−φ
Z
1 −∆Q
e);
P ∗n when Qm = −φ
Z
n −∆Q
e,
n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I + J − 1};
Pn when Qm ∈ (−φ
Z
n−1 −∆Q
e,−φZn −∆Q
e),
n ∈ {2, 3, . . . , I + J − 1};
PI+J when Qm ∈ (−φ
Z
I+J−1 −∆Q
e,+∞);
where for any n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , I + J − 1}
P ∗n =


Pn CASE 1;
Pn+1 CASE 2;
max{Pn,min{Pref , Pn+1}} CASE 3;
for CASE 1: either AZn = [Pn, Pn+1) or A
Z
n = (Pn, Pn+1) with
|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n −∆Q
e, Pn) |<|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n −∆Q
e, Pn+1) |;
for CASE 2: either AZn = (Pn, Pn+1] or A
Z
n = (Pn, Pn+1) with
|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n −∆Q
e, Pn) |>|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n −∆Q
e, Pn+1) |;
for CASE 3: either AZn = [Pn, Pn+1] or A
Z
n = (Pn, Pn+1) with
|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n −∆Q
e, Pn) |=|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n −∆Q
e, Pn+1) | .
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3.3.2 Expected Xetra Auction Allocation Function
QeD > 0 has no impact on the trader’s final transaction volume when the trader
submits a market bid order Qm > 0, since the trader’s market bid order has
higher time priority and thus will be executed prior to QeD. Q
e
S < 0 increases
the maximum quantity that the trader can buy from the market. Analogously,
QeS < 0 has no impact on the trader’s final transaction volume when the trader
submits a market ask order Qm < 0 and Q
e
D > 0 increases the maximum quantity
that the trader can sell to the market. Thus, the trader’s subjective expectation
ZeX(Qm) on Xetra auction allocation function is obtained as follows:
Proposition 3.2. Given Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 3.3, the trader’s sub-
jective expectation ZeX(Qm) on Xetra auction allocation function takes the form:
ZeX(Qm) = max{(−φ
Z
0 −Q
e
D)
−,min{Qm, (−φ
Z
I+J −Q
e
S)
+}}.
3.4 Portfolio Selection Problem
With its initial endowment (y0, Z0) at the beginning of the trading period, the
trader conducts its forecast and expects the subjective probability distribution
ν ∈ Prob(R) for the future cum-dividend risky asset price q˜ at the end of the
trading period with the expected mean value qe ∈ R and the associated variance
V e ∈ R+. With Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 3.3, the trader constructs its
subjective expectation P eX(Qm) on Xetra auction price function and Z
e
X(Qm) on
the allocation function which are derived from Proposition 3.1 and Proposition
3.2 respectively.
With the price of the risk-free asset normalized to 1, the trader has the budget
constraint:
ye + P eX(Qm) · Z
e
X(Qm) = 0, (3.12)
where ye is the trader’s expected trading quantity of the risk-free asset.
The trader expects to obtain the portfolio holding (y0 + y
e, Z0 + Z
e
X(Qm)) after
trading. Embedding with the budget constraint (3.12), the trader’s future wealth
at the end of the trading period is:
W1 = R(y0 + y
e) + q˜ · (Z0 + Z
e
X(Qm))
= [q˜ −RP eX(Qm)] · Z
e
X(Qm) + q˜Z0 +Ry0.
The expected value of the trader’s future wealth is
Eν [W1] = [q
e − RP eX(Qm)] · Z
e
X(Qm) + q
eZ0 +Ry0,
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and the associated variance is
Vν [W1] = [Z
e
X(Qm) + Z0]
2 · V e.
We assume that the trader takes the preference on the mean µ and on the variance
σ2 of her future wealth. The utility function is represented as:
U :
{
R× R+ −→ R
(µ, σ2) 7−→ U(µ, σ2),
(3.13)
which is strictly quasi concave. It is increasing in µ and decreasing in σ2.
The trader submits a market order to Xetra auction market with the integer
trading quantity. The portfolio selection problem that the trader faces is to find
the integer solution Q∗m for:
max
Qm∈Z
U(Eν [W1],Vν [W1]) (3.14)
⇔ max
Qm∈Z
U([qe −RP eX(Qm)] · Z
e
X(Qm) + q
eZ0 +Ry0 , [Z
e
X(Qm) + Z0]
2 · V e)
⇔ max
Qm∈Z
Υ(Qm);
where Υ(Qm) is the short form of the trader’s utility function.
The portfolio selection problem depicted in (3.14) considers that the trader is
a price setter who can manipulate the current Xetra auction price through its
market order with the quoted trading quantity Qm, cf. the investment decision
of the monopolist/monopsonist in Horst & Wenzelburger (2010). This portfolio
selection problem is an extension of conventional M-V model and is called the
extended M-V model.
3.4.1 Computational Process
ZeX(Qm) has both an upper bound (−φ
Z
I+J − Q
e
S)
+ and a lower bound (−φZ0 −
QeD)
−. We assume that the trader would not submit a market order Qm out of
these two bounds as in the ‘real’ market the trader would have to pay extra effort
to handle the unexecuted part of market order after trading. Thus the trader
considers Qm ∈ [(−φ
Z
0 − Q
e
D)
−, (−φZI+J − Q
e
S)
+], which implies that ZeX(Qm) =
Qm. Without loss of generality, we assume −φ
Z
I+J −Q
e
S ≥ 0 and −φ
Z
0 −Q
e
D ≤ 0.
The trader considers the integer quantity Qm ∈ [−φ
Z
0 − Q
e
D,−φ
Z
I+J − Q
e
S] and
aims at selecting the integer quantity Qm
∗ that solves portfolio selection problem
(3.14).
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The difficulty in solving portfolio selection problem (3.14) comes from the step
functional form of P eX(Qm) which may not be tractable by employing conventional
methods in mathematical analysis. To construct a computational process that
solves portfolio selection problem (3.14), we investigate the structure of P eX(Qm).
Proposition 3.1 implies that one can derive a partition of [−φZ0 −Q
e
D,−φ
Z
I+J−Q
e
S ]
with:
Θ :=
{
[−φZ0 −Q
e
D,−φ
Z
1 −∆Q
e
[]
, . . . ,
[]
−φZI+J−1 −∆Q
e,−φZI+J −Q
e
S]
}
.
The partition Θ contains I + J intervals, denoted by Θi for i = 1, . . . , I + J .
The value of P eX(Qm) remains constant with P
e
X(Qm) = Pi for Qm ∈ Θi, i =
1, . . . , I + J . When we consider portfolio selection problem (3.14) restricted in
the interval Θi, we can ignore the step functional form of P
e
X(Qm) and take it as
constant. Thus, the first step of solving portfolio selection problem (3.14) is to
divide the portfolio selection problem into a series of subproblems:
max
Qm∈Θi
⋂
Z
U([qe − RPi] ·Qm + q
eZ0 +Ry0 , [Qm + Z0]
2 · V e), (3.15)
for i = 1, . . . , I + J .
The interval Θi is not necessarily a compact interval, thus it is difficult to ap-
ply conventional methods in mathematical analysis to solve portfolio selection
subproblem (3.15). One possibility to resolve this difficulty is to make the com-
pactification of partition Θ, i.e. to extend each interval Θi ∈ Θ to a compact
interval Θi and allow P
e
X(Qm) = Pi for Qm ∈ Θi when P
e
X(Qm) = Pi for Qm ∈ Θi.
One obtains the compactification Θ of the partition Θ with
Θ :=
{
[−φZ0 −Q
e
D,−φ
Z
1 −∆Q
e], . . . , [−φZI+J−1 −∆Q
e,−φZI+J −Q
e
S]
}
.
Since Θi ∈ Θ is a compact interval and P
e
X(Qm) remains constant with P
e
X(Qm) =
Pi for Qm ∈ Θi, one constructs the portfolio selection subproblem
max
Qm∈Θi
U([qe − RPi] ·Qm + q
eZ0 +Ry0 , [Qm + Z0]
2 · V e) (3.16)
and computes the unique maximizer Qi∗m ∈ Θi for i ∈ {1, . . . , I + J}.
For i ∈ {1, . . . , I+J}, the unique maximizer Qi∗m ∈ Θi is generically a real number
which is not the integer solution that the trader expects to obtain. We define
the integer set Int[Qi∗m] for each maximizer Q
i∗
m of portfolio selection subproblem
(3.16) as follows: If the maximizer Qi∗m is on the boundary of Θi, then the integer
set Int[Qi∗m] collects the integer in Θi that is nearest toQ
i∗
m. If the maximizer Q
i∗
m is
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in the interior of Θi, then the integer set Int[Q
i∗
m] collects two consecutive integers
in Θi between which Q
i∗
m lies. The uniqueness of maximizer Q
i∗
m and the well-
behaveness of objective function infer that the integer maximizer for portfolio
selection subproblem (3.15) lies in the integer set Int[Qi∗m] which contains the
integer in Θi that is nearest to Q
i∗
m.
Group together all integer sets Int[Qi∗m] for i ∈ {1, . . . , I + J} to construct a new
integer set:
Int[Qm] :=
⋃
i∈{1,...,I+J}
Int[Qi∗m].
Since all integer maximizers of portfolio selection subproblem (3.15) for i ∈
{1, . . . , I + J} lie in the integer set Int[Qm], the integer solution of portfolio
selection problem (3.14) also lies in the integer set Int[Qm]. Calculate the maxi-
mum utility Umax of portfolio selection problem (3.14) for integer Qm ∈ Int[Qm]
as:
Umax = max
Qm∈Int[Qm]
Υ(Qm).
Notice that the uniqueness of maximizer for max
Qm∈Int[Qm]
Υ(Qm) can not be ensured.
Thus, one attains the set of all integer maximizers for portfolio selection problem
(3.14):
Θ∗ = {Qm ∈ Int[Qm] | Υ(Qm) = Umax}.
To achieve a unique maximizer Qm
∗, one has to apply additional criterion to
choose one element from Θ∗ when there is more than one maximizer, i.e. ♯Θ∗ > 1.
The criterion of selecting a unique maximizer Qm
∗ from Θ∗ is by and large sub-
jective. For example, one criterion is to randomly choose Qm
∗ from Θ∗. The
criterion applied in this work is to choose the minimum trading quantity from
Θ∗, i.e. Qm
∗ = min
Qm∈Θ∗
|Qm|. This criterion is based on the consideration that
the trader intends to have the trading quantity as small as possible to attain the
same utility and that the trader is inclined to buy the risky asset from the market
and to hold it rather than to sell the risky asset to the market.
The computational process that achieves a unique integer solution for portfolio
selection problem (3.14) is depicted in Procedure 3.1. Proposition 3.3 verifies that
the solution calculated by Procedure 3.1 is the integer maximizer for portfolio
selection problem (3.14).
Proposition 3.3. The unique integer solution calculated by Procedure 3.1 is the
integer maximizer of portfolio selection problem (3.14).
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Procedure 3.1 Computational process for portfolio selection problem
1: Derive
Θ =
{
[−φZ0 −Q
e
D,−φ
Z
1 −∆Q
e
[]
, . . . ,
[]
−φZI+J−1 −∆Q
e,−φZI+J −Q
e
S]
}
such that P eX(Qm) = Pi for Qm ∈ Θi ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, . . . , I + J}.
2: Make the Compactification
Θ =
{
[−φZ0 −Q
e
D,−φ
Z
1 −∆Q
e], . . . , [−φZI+J−1 −∆Q
e,−φZI+J −Q
e
S]
}
such that P eX(Qm) = Pi for Qm ∈ Θi ∈ Θ if P
e
X(Qm) = Pi for Qm ∈ Θi ∈ Θ,
i ∈ {1, . . . , I + J}.
3: for i = 1 to I + J do
4: Compute the unique maximizer
Qi∗m = arg max
Qm∈Θi
U([qe − RPi] ·Qm + q
eZ0 +Ry0 , [Qm + Z0]
2 · V e).
5: if Qi∗m is on the boundary of Θi then
6: Int[Qi∗m] = {Qm ∈ Θi | Qm is the nearest interger to Q
i∗
m}.
7: else if Qi∗m is in interior of Θi then
8: Int[Qi∗m] = {Qm, Qm + 1 ∈ Θi | Qm ≤ Q
i∗
m < Qm + 1 and Qm ∈ Z}.
9: end if
10: end for
11: Construct the integer set Int[Qm] =
⋃
i∈{1,...,I+J}
Int[Qi∗m].
12: Compute Umax = max
Qm∈Int[Qm]
υ(Qm).
13: Compute the set of integer maximizer Θ∗ = {Qm ∈ Int[Qm] | υ(Qm) = Umax}.
14: if ♯Θ∗ = 1 then
15: return the unique maximizer Qm
∗ ∈ Θ∗.
16: else if ♯Θ∗ > 1 then
17: return Qm
∗ = min
Qm∈Θ∗
|Qm|.
18: end if
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Proof. Step 1 in Procedure 3.1 derives the partition Θ from P eX(Qm) such that
portfolio selection problem (3.14) can be divided into a series of subproblems
(3.15) for i ∈ {1, . . . , I + J}. Step 2 makes the compactification Θ in order
to transform subproblem (3.15) into subproblem (3.16) that can be solved by
applying analytical tools. Step 4 calculates the unique maximizer Qi∗m ∈ Θi
of portfolio selection subproblem (3.16) for i ∈ {1, . . . , I + J}, given that the
objective function is continuous strictly quasi concave in a compact interval.
Step 5 to Step 8 construct the integer set Int[Qi∗m] which contains the integer in
Θi that is nearest to Q
i∗
m. When Q
i∗
m is on the boundary of Θi, Int[Q
i∗
m] contains
the integer in Θi that is nearest to Q
i∗
m. This is implemented in Step 6 with
Int[Qi∗m] = {Qm ∈ Θi | Qm is the nearest interger to Q
i∗
m}. When Q
i∗
m is in the
interior of Θi, the integer set Int[Q
i∗
m] contains two consecutive integers in Θi
between which Qi∗m lies. This case is implemented in Step 8 with Int[Q
i∗
m] =
{Qm, Qm + 1 ∈ Θi | Qm ≤ Q
i∗
m < Qm + 1 and Qm ∈ Z}. Since Q
i∗
m is the unique
maximizer of subproblem (3.16) in the compact interval Θi that differs from Θi
only at boundary points, the integer maximizer of subproblem (3.15) lies in the
integer set Int[Qi∗m] containing integers in Θi that are nearest to Q
i∗
m.
Step 11 collects all elements in integer sets Int[Qi∗m] for i ∈ {1, . . . , I + J} into
the integer set Int[Qm] which is a subset of [−φ
Z
0 − Q
e
D,−φ
Z
I+J − Q
e
S]. Step 12
computes the maximum utility Umax for Qm ∈ Int[Qm], and Step 13 collects
all integer quantities corresponding to the maximum utility Umax into the set of
integer maximizers Θ∗. The integer set Int[Qm] contains all integer solutions of
subproblem (3.15) for i ∈ {1, . . . , I+J}, which implies that the integer solution of
portfolio selection problem (3.14) lies in Int[Qm]. Hence, any quantity Qm
∗ ∈ Θ∗
is the integer maximizer of portfolio selection problem (3.14).
When there is only one element in Θ∗, i.e. ♯Θ∗ = 1, Procedure 3.1 returns this
unique quantity as the integer maximizer of portfolio selection problem (3.14).
When ♯Θ∗ > 1, Procedure 3.1 applies in Step 17 the criterion of minimum trading
quantity to return a unique maximizer Qm
∗ = min
Qm∈Θ∗
|Qm| as the integer maxi-
mizer of portfolio selection problem (3.14). Therefore, Procedure 3.1 calculates
a unique integer maximizer for portfolio selection problem (3.14).
We demonstrate in the following example how to apply Procedure 3.1 to solve
portfolio selection problem for the trader in Xetra auction market.
Example 3.5. The market has the order book in Example 3.1 when the trader
makes its investment decision. The order book is shown in Figure 3.2. The
corresponding excess demand function is depicted in (3.3).
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To simplify the calculation, we assume that the trader does not hold any risky
asset or risk-free asset at the beginning of the trading period with y0 = 0 and
Z0 = 0. The trader expects Q
e
D = 50 and Q
e
S = −50, which implies ∆Q
e = 0.
Thus, P eX(Qm) takes the form of (3.9). The trader’s subjective expectation on
Xetra auction allocation function takes the form:
ZeX(Qm) = max{(−φ
Z
0 −Q
e
D)
−,min{Qm, (−φ
Z
I+J −Q
e
S)
+}}
= max{−400,min{Qm, 250}}. (3.17)
The trader is assumed to take the linear mean-variance preference depicted with
the utility function:
U(Eν [W1],Vν [W1]) = Eν [W1]−
α
2
Vν [W1] (3.18)
= [qe − RP eX(Qm)] · Z
e
X(Qm) + q
eZ0 +Ry0 −
α
2
[ZeX(Qm) + Z0]
2 · V e,
where α is the measure of absolute risk aversion, see Wenzelburger (2004).
Assume that the interest factor of the risk-free asset is R = 1.05. The trader
expects the mean value of the future cum-dividend price as qe = 250 and its
associated variance as V e = 25. Consider α = 1.2, the portfolio selection problem
of the trader is then to compute the integer quantity Q∗m that maximizes the
trader’s utility with its subjective expectation P eX(Qm) depicted in (3.9) and its
subjective expectation ZeX(Qm) depicted in (3.17):
max
Qm∈[−400,250]
⋂
Z
[250− 1.05P eX(Qm)] ·Qm − 15 ·Q
2
m.
By applying Procedure 3.1, one derives the partition
Θ =
{
[−400,−250), [−250,−150), [−150,−100], (−100, 50], (50, 250]
}
.
Make the Compactification
Θ =
{
[−400,−250], [−250,−150], [−150,−100], [−100, 50], [50, 250]
}
.
For each i = 1, . . . , 5, compute the unique maximizer
Qi∗m = arg max
Qm∈Θi
[250− 1.05P eX(Qm)] ·Qm − 15 ·Q
2
m
and the corresponding integer set Int[Qi∗m]. One obtains Q
1∗
m = −250. Since Q
1∗
m
is on the boundary of Θ1 and Q
1∗
m 6∈ Θ1, the nearest integer to Q
1∗
m in Θ1 is
−251. Thus, one obtains Int[Q1∗m ] = {−251}. Similarly, one obtains Q
2∗
m = −150
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with Int[Q2∗m ] = {−151}, Q
3∗
m = −100 with Int[Q
3∗
m ] = {−100}, Q
4∗
m = 1.30 with
Int[Q4∗m ] = {1, 2}, and Q
5∗
m = 50 with Int[Q
5∗
m ] = {51}.
Construct the integer set Int[Qm] = {−251,−151,−100, 1, 2, 51}. Compute Umax =
max{−955582.1,−348213.55,−154000, 23.95, 17.9,−37082.1} = 23.95 and the
set of integer maximizer Θ∗ = {1}.2 The unique maximizer is thus Qm
∗ = 1,
which implies that the trader submits a market bid order with the quoted trad-
ing quantity Qm
∗ = 1.
In this chapter we have investigated the investment decision of the trader in
Xetra auction market. We have constructed the trader’s subjective expectation
P eX(Qm) on Xetra auction price and Z
e
X(Qm) on the final transaction volume
which take the functional forms with the variable of the quoted trading quantity
Qm in its market order. Then we have developed the extended M-V model by
incorporating the trader’s subjective expectation P eX(Qm) and Z
e
X(Qm) with the
mean-variance framework. We have constructed the computational process of
Procedure 3.1 to calculate the integer solution for the trader’s optimal trading
quantity in the extended M-V model.
2The computation in Example 3.5 is conducted in the computer software Mathematica.
Chapter 4
Xetra Auction Market System
In this chapter we investigate the non market-clearing price dynamics in Xe-
tra auction market by constructing the ACE model of Xetra auction market
system (XAMS). Based on constructive aspects of the economic system, which
are derived from systems theory and the methodology of Agent-Based Modeling
(ABM), we propose an integrative framework for ACE modelling in section 4.1
that works as general guidance on constructing the ACE model from ‘bottom-up’.
We employ this integrative framework in section 4.2 to construct the ACE model
of XAMS. With the implementation of the ACE model in a computer software
system with the programming language Groovy/Java, we conduct in section 4.3
the computational market experiment and analyze the economic properties of
market dynamics in simulation results.
4.1 Agent-based Modelling of Economic System
According to Tesfatsion (2006), Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE)
is a computational study on the dynamical economic system from ‘bottom-up’.
Economists in this strand construct the ACE model of the economic system by
modelling the interaction of the components that are termed as economic entities
in the economic system. An agent in the ACE model is a bundle of computational
processes that represent the functionality of the economic entity in the economic
system. An ACE model is a collection of agents interacting with each other to
represent the global behavior of the economic system.
In general, we follow the ACE modelling procedure that is depicted in Figure
4.1. First, by applying the ABM method which considers modelling the system
as a collection of interacting agents, the ACE modeler analyzes the economic
system and constructs the corresponding ACE model. Then the ACE modeler
employs computer programming languages to implement the ACE model as the
computer software system. After that, the ACE modeler initiates and executes
the software system to observe in the computer environment the evolution of the
software system which represents the dynamics of the economic system.
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Figure 4.1: ACE modelling procedure.
An ACE model is an abstracted representation of the economic system. It is
independent of the computer programming language and is not a computer soft-
ware system. The current difficulty of constructing the ACE model is the lack of
guidance and general principles which economists could follow when constructing
ACE models, e.g. see LeBaron (2006). To overcome this difficulty, we propose
in this work an integrative framework for ACE modelling which serves as gen-
eral guidance to analyze the economic system from ‘bottom-up’ and to construct
the corresponding ACE model. The foundation of this integrative framework is
derived from systems theory and the methodology of ABM, which is depicted as
constructive aspects of the economic system.
4.1.1 Constructive Aspects of Economic System
Constructive aspects of the economic system have the epistemic root in the sys-
tematic principle of economic phenomena and processes, i.e. economic phenom-
ena and processes can be regarded as states and evolutionary processes of the
corresponding economic systems.1
From systems theory and the methodology of ABM, an economic system can be
regarded as a dynamical open system which interacts with its environment in
1The systematic principle of economic phenomena and processes is the specification of the
systems theory in the field of economics, see Bertalanffy (1993).
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society. An economic system is a collection of economic entities (consumers,
firms, commodities, markets, etc.) interacting with each other such that the in-
teractions of economic entities perform macroscopic behavior of the system given
the influence from the environment. To explicitly analyze and model an economic
system from ‘bottom-up’ is equivalent to stipulating the following constructive
aspects of the economic system:
I. The scope of the economic system and its environment;
II. The interrelation between the economic system and its environment;
III. Elements of the economic system, which are economic entities considered
in the economic system;
IV. The structure of the economic system, which is the interrelation among
elements of the economic system.
To model an economic system from ‘bottom-up’, constructive aspects of the eco-
nomic system suggest the integrative framework to formulate aspects I to IV of
the economic system and their updating rules (also called state transition rules)
which represent the dynamics of the economic system.
The economist normally specifies the scope of the economic system and its en-
vironment when initiating economic research. Consider the composite of the
economic system and its environment as the economic world and regard the inter-
relation between the economic system and its environment as information flows.2
The integrative framework formulates the ACE world which integrates the ACE
model of the economic system and its environment with the information flows.
As observed in contemporary economic literature, economists tend to classify eco-
nomic entities into different types in order to investigate the characteristics of each
type. For example, Pindyck & Rubinfeld (2001) clusters microeconomic entities
into consumers, producers (firms), commodities, markets, etc. The integrative
framework follows this classification of economic entities to stipulate elements in
the economic system and the corresponding agents in the ACE model.
The integrative framework represents the structure of the economic system as
the information flows among agents in the ACE model. To explicitly depict in
the ACE model the structure of the economic system, the integrative framework
2The concept of information can be termed as diversified meanings. Here the information
is considered as quantitative representations of the economic world. Knowledge, methods, and
actions are regarded as information in this sense once they can be quantified.
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proposes the diagram of the relationship for the ACE model in which nodes
represent agents in the ACE model and in which arcs represent information flows
between agents.3 The diagram of the relationship represents the interrelation
between the economic system and its environment as the arcs which connect the
corresponding ACE model with its environment.
Now the crucial point for the integrative framework is to model economic entities
with the concept of agents. Most economic entities investigated in economic
research are concerned with the functionality and behavior of individuals or a
group of people in an economic world. We denote all these economic entities
interpreting the functionality of human subject as active economic entities in
the sense that they behave actively to fulfill their needs and objectives. Economic
entities which are not directly involved with the functionality of human subject,
e.g. commodities traded in the markets, are classified as passive economic
entities. Correspondingly, we denote the agent representing the active economic
entity as the active economic agent and the agent representing the passive
economic entity as the passive economic agent.
An economic system can be treated as an economic entity that is used to con-
struct another economic system, whereas an element in the economic system can
be treated as an economic system. This property of system-element duality guar-
antees the hierarchy of economic systems, see Potts (2000). More importantly,
this property infers that one can consider the economic entity as a collection of
components whose interaction among each other provides the functionality of the
economic entity and thus one can model the economic entity by formulating its
constructive aspects.
4.1.2 Constructive Aspects of Active Economic Entity
In economic literature, active economic entities represent the functionality of
decision makers in the economic world. The concept of the decision maker has
been investigated in various fields in science, including psychology, sociology,
computer science, etc. As we are looking for the general framework to construct
the ACE model that is to be implemented as a computer software system, we
employ the related concepts in computer science and combine with decision theory
3The diagram of the relationship for the ACE model serves the same purpose as the class
diagram which describes the static structure of objects in a system and their relationships
in Unified Modelling Language (UML), see Blaha & Rumbaugh (2004). Comparing with the
class diagram in UML, the diagram of the relationship for the ACE model emphasizes on the
connections of information flows among agents.
4.1. AGENT-BASED MODELLING OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM 63
in economics to model the active economic entity.
The skeleton of the decision maker is stated in the concept of the agent in arti-
ficial intelligence (AI), a subfield of computer science. An agent in this field is
“anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through sensors and
acting upon that environment through actuators” (Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 32).
Although it lacks of a unified model of the agent in AI, we take a pragmatic
viewpoint and propose a general pattern by integrating behavioral rules of active
economic entities with the current concept of the learning agent in AI, see (p. 53,
ibid.). This general pattern, known as the module of active economic agent
(MAEA), is regarded as constructive aspects of the active economic entity and
is composed of the submodule of information acquirement, the submodule of
storage, the submodule of learning, the submodule of objectives, the submodule
of forecasting, and the submodule of action transmission. One applies MAEA
to construct the corresponding active economic agent from ‘bottom-up’ by spe-
cifying its submodules and the interrelation among submodules. We sketch the
functionality of each submodule with the structure of MAEA illustrated in Figure
4.2.
The environment in Figure 4.2 represents those parts that are out of the scope
of the active economic agent. The information flows between MAEA and the
environment represent the interrelation of the agent with others in the economic
system.
The submodule of information acquirement establishes the connections with its
environment and collects information through the interrelations. The submodule
of storage stores the information about the state of the agent. It collects the
information transmitted from other submodules and sends out the information on
request. The submodule of forecasting generates the forecast on uncertain factors
that the agent considers. The submodule of objectives depicts the objectives
that the agent intends to achieve, selects the action plan based on its designated
objectives, and sends out the action plan to the submodule of action transmission
to realize the action. The submodule of action transmission receives action plans
from the submodule of objectives and realizes the action through its interrelations
with the environment. The submodule of learning considers the learning process
of the agent, which might not be constructed as it is not a compulsory piece when
modelling the agent in economic literature.
The state of the active economic agent evolves when the agent acts to fulfill its
objectives. The updating rules of the agent are thus the decision making process
that is presented by interactions among submodules.
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Figure 4.2: Structure of MAEA.
The decision making process generally starts when the agent initiates its state.
The agent observes information via the submodule of information acquirement
and keeps the information in its memory via the submodule of storage. Then it
applies the submodule of learning to update itself, e.g. to update the forecasting
methods currently applied in the submodule of forecasting in order to provide
more accurate forecasts on uncertain factors that the agent considers. After
that, the agent generates its subjective forecast via the submodule of forecasting,
selects the action plan to fulfill its objectives via the submodule of objectives,
and transmits the action to the economic system via the submodule of action
transmission. Finally, the agent receives from the environment the feedback of
its action. This general decision making process is illustrated in Figure 4.3 and
is worked as a benchmark for depicting the updating rules of active economic
agents.
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Figure 4.3: General decision making process of active economic agent.
4.1.3 Constructive Aspects of Passive Economic Entity
Passive economic entities do not behave actively to fulfill their objectives. They
mainly act as information providers that disseminate information to active eco-
nomic entities on request. We propose a general pattern named the module
of passive economic agent (MPEA) to construct passive economic agents.
MPEA consists of a set of economic properties that represent the informa-
tion considered in the agent and associated operations, such as the operation
of updating information that is regarded as the updating rules of the agent.
4.1.4 Integrative Framework for ACE Modelling
The integrative framework for ACE modelling is a modelling process that applies
the constructive aspects of the economic system and of the economic entities to
translate the economic system into the corresponding ACE model. Given the
economic system in study, the integrative framework starts with specifying con-
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structive aspects of the economic system. Then it applies MAEA and MPEA
as templates to formulate the corresponding economic agents in the economic
system. It models the updating rules of active economic agents with the decision
making process and the updating rules of passive economic agents with the oper-
ation of updating information. The updating rules of economic agents constitute
the updating rules of the ACE model. Given information flows between the ACE
model and its environment, the interactions among agents generate the dynamics
of the model. The integrative framework proposes in the form of the flowchart
the diagram of the interaction for the ACE model that describes the sequence
of workflows and activities among agents. This diagram explicitly depicts the in-
teractions among agents in the dynamic process of the ACE model.4 In summary,
the integrative framework contains the modelling procedure as follows:
1. Specify constructive aspects of the economic system;
2. Construct corresponding agents in the ACE model by applying MAEA and
MPEA respectively, model the decision making process of active economic
agents and the operation of updating information in passive economic agents;
3. Present the diagram of the interaction to describe the sequence of workflows
and activities among agents for the dynamics of the ACE model.
4.2 ACE Model of Xetra Auction Market Sys-
tem
We apply the integrative framework to construct the ACE model of XAMS.
Consider an economic world with one risky asset market and one risk-free asset
market in trading period t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. The economic world applies Euro (e) as
the trading currency. The risky asset considered in the market has no dividend
and is traded in integer shares, i.e. traders can trade 19 shares of the risky asset
but not 19.81 shares. The risk-free asset is divisible in any trading quantity with
the trading price normalized to 1. It has a constant interest factor R which can
be interpreted as 1 + r with r denoting the nominal interest rate. N traders
participate in the economic world to trade in the risky asset market and the risk-
free asset market. The economic world has no transaction cost and no short sale
constraint for traders.
4The diagram of the interaction can be regarded as the flowchart version of the activity
diagram in Unified Modelling Language (UML), which is to represent the sequence of activities
among components in the system, see Blaha & Rumbaugh (2004).
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The risky asset market is a Xetra auction market that holds one Xetra auction
for each trading period to determine the market price and the trading volume
by XAMM. Xetra auction consists of the call phase and the price determination
phase. During the call phase, XAMM disseminates the real-time trading data
of the central order book in the market. Upon observing the real-time trading
data from the market, traders perform their investment decisions and submit
orders. XAMM then collects the submitted orders to the central order book and
simultaneously updates the real-time trading data. The call phase stops randomly
after a fixed time span and the price determination phase follows to determine
Xetra auction price and the final transaction volumes. After that, XAMM cancels
the unexecuted part of the orders and conducts the settlement to complete the
payment for each transaction. After trading in Xetra auction market, traders
interact with the risk-free asset market and trade for the risk-free asset.
We focus on Xetra auction market and regard the risk-free asset market as the
environment of Xetra auction market. Given the information flows from the
risk-free asset market, the interactions among traders and XAMM provide the
functionality of Xetra auction market, i.e. determining the trading price and
reallocating the risky asset among traders. We apply the integrative framework
to construct the ACE model of XAMS. The first step is to consider constructive
aspects of XAMS.
Example 4.1 (Constructive aspects of XAMS).
I. XAMS considers economic entities which operate in the market, i.e. N
traders, XAMM, the numeraire employed in the market, and the risky asset
traded in the market. The environment of XAMS is the risk-free asset market.
II. XAMS connects to the risk-free asset market to request the information
of the interest factor R as well as to transmit trader’s trading request on the
risk-free asset. The risk-free asset market connects to XAMS to inform traders
the interest factor R as well as their realized trading quantities of the risk-free
asset. These information flows represent the interrelation between XAMS and
its environment.
III. XAMS is regarded as a dynamical system which implicitly contains the
concept of time. We propose the concept of the system clock to provide the
information of the time considered in the ACE model. Thus, elements of XAMS
as well as the corresponding ACE model are: N traders, XAMM, the numeraire,
the risky asset, and the system clock.
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IV. Consider a decentralized market. Traders connect with XAMM in order
to perform the trading behavior, whereas there is no direct connection among
traders. Traders and XAMM connect to the numeraire, the risky asset, and the
system clock to have access to the associated information. Denote Xetra auction
market center in the ACE model as a composite of XAMM, the numeraire, the
risky asset, and the system clock. Then the structure of XAMS follows the
type of the star network, see Figure 4.4. Xetra auction market center as the
central node in the star network connects with all other nodes of traders in the
ACE model.
…
…
…
…
..…
...
Risky
Asset
XAMM
System
Clock
Numeraire
Figure 4.4: Diagram of the relationship for ACE model of XAMS.
Classify agents in XAMS as active economic agents of N traders and XAMM with
passive economic agents of the numeraire, the risky asset, and the system clock.
The second step of the integrative framework is to apply MAEA and MPEA to
construct these agents respectively.
We consider three types of traders in XAMS. The first type is the price setter who
assumes that, with the knowledge on XAMM and the real-time trading data, it
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could manipulate the current trading price as well as its transaction volume by its
trading behavior. The second type is the price taker who believes that its trading
behavior has no impact on the market. The last type is the noise trader who is
assumed to act randomly in the market. Assume trader 1 in the ACE model as
the price setter, trader j ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1} as price takers, and trader N as the
noise trader. For simplicity, further assume that each trader submits at most one
order in each trading period with price setter and noise trader submitting the
market order and price takers submitting the limit order. We apply MAEA to
construct trader 1 in Example 4.2, trader j ∈ {2, . . . , N −1} in Example 4.3, and
trader N in Example 4.4 respectively.
Example 4.2 (Trader 1). As stated in Figure 4.4, trader 1 connects with Xetra
auction market center and the risk-free asset market. At the beginning of the
trading period t, trader 1 is with the initial endowment (y
(1)
0 [t], Z
(1)
0 [t]) where
y
(1)
0 [t] is the initial holding of the risk-free asset and Z
(1)
0 [t] is the initial holding
of the risky asset. Trader 1 obtains through its submodule of information ac-
quirement the interest factor R from the risk-free asset market and the real-time
data set I0[t] of the central order book from XAMM.
By applying the submodule of forecasting, trader 1 computes the expected mean
value qe(1)[t] of the risky asset price for the next trading period t+1 and its asso-
ciated variance V e(1)[t]. As trader 1 can manipulate the current trading price as
well as its transaction volume by submitting its market order, it performs its sub-
jective forecast P
e(1)
X [t](Qm) on the current Xetra auction price and Z
e(1)
X [t](Qm)
on the final transaction volume for period t which are functions with the con-
trol variable Qm of the quoted trading quantity in its market order. Essentially,
P
e(1)
X [t](Qm) presents the trader’s subjective belief on the inverse demand func-
tion of the market with the control variable of the quoted trading quantity Qm
in its market order and Z
e(1)
X [t](Qm) depicts its subjective belief on the allocation
function of the market.
With its forecast of {P e(1)X [t](Qm), Z
e(1)
X [t](Qm), q
e(1)[t], V e(1)[t]}, the trader has
the budget constraint:
P
e(1)
X [t](Qm) · Z
e(1)
X [t](Qm) + y
e(1)[t] = 0, (4.1)
where ye(1)[t] is the trader’s expected trading quantity of the risk-free asset in
period t. The trader expects the portfolio holding after trading in period t as
(y
(1)
0 [t] + y
e(1)[t], Z
(1)
0 [t] + Z
e(1)
X [t](Qm)). Complying with the budget constraint
(4.1), the trader considers the mean value mean(1)[t] of its future wealth at the
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end of the trading period t as:
mean(1)[t] = {qe(1)[t]− R · P
e(1)
X [t](Qm)} · Z
e(1)
X [t](Qm)
+qe(1)[t] · Z
(1)
0 [t] +Ry
(1)
0 [t]. (4.2)
The associated variance var(1)[t] is as:
var(1)[t] = {Z
(1)
0 [t] + Z
e(1)
X [t](Qm)}
2 · V e(1)[t]. (4.3)
We assume that trader 1 takes the linear mean-variance preference. The trader
presents its objective in the submodule of objectives as the portfolio selection
problem:
max
Qm∈Z
mean(1)[t]−
α1
2
var(1)[t] (4.4)
⇔ max
Qm∈Z
{qe(1)[t]− R · P
e(1)
X [t](Qm)} · Z
e(1)
X [t](Qm)
+qe(1)[t] · Z
(1)
0 [t] +Ry
(1)
0 [t]−
α1
2
{Z
(1)
0 [t] + Z
e(1)
X [t](Qm)}
2 · V e(1)[t],
where α1 is a constant measure of absolute risk aversion. Trader 1 solves this
portfolio selection problem (4.4) and obtains the integer maximizer Q
(1)
m [t] with
Q
(1)
m [t] > 0 denoting the trading quantity on the demand side and Q
(1)
m [t] <
0 denoting the trading quantity on the supply side. Then the trader submits
the market order with the quoted trading quantity Q
(1)
m [t] to XAMM via the
submodule of action transmission.
Trader 1 realizes the trading price PX [t] and its transaction volume Z
(1)
X [t] after
XAMM determines the trading price and the trading volume in the price deter-
mination phase. Then the trader completes with XAMM the payment for its
transaction.
After trading the risky asset, trader 1 attains from the risk-free asset market the
share y(1)[t] = −PX [t] · Z
(1)
X [t] of the risk-free asset. The portfolio holding that
the trader acquires after trading in period t is (y
(1)
0 [t] + y
(1)[t], Z
(1)
0 [t] + Z
(1)
X [t])
and the trader’s initial endowment of the next trading period t+ 1 is{
y
(1)
0 [t+ 1] = R(y
(1)
0 [t] + y
(1)[t]),
Z
(1)
0 [t+ 1] = Z
(1)
0 [t] + Z
(1)
X [t].
(4.5)
The decision making process of trader 1 is illustrated in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Decision making process of trader 1 in Example 4.2.
Example 4.3 (Trader j = 2, . . . ,N− 1). Analogous to trader 1, trader j con-
nects with Xetra auction market center and the risk-free asset market. At
the beginning of the trading period t, trader j is with the initial endowment
(y
(j)
0 [t], Z
(j)
0 [t]). The trader obtains through its submodule of information ac-
quirement the interest factor R and the real-time order book data set I0[t].
By applying the submodule of forecasting, trader j computes the expected mean
value qe(j)[t] of the risky asset price for the next trading period t + 1 and its
associated variance V e(j)[t]. As the trader has to decide a limit price to quote in
its limit order, the trader conducts its subjective forecast P
e(j)
X [t] on the current
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Xetra auction price and regards its forecast as the limit price. The trader expects
it will realize from the market the quoted trading quantity Ql in its limit order.
With its forecast of {qe(j)[t], V e(j)[t], P
e(j)
X [t]}, the trader has the budget con-
straint:
P
e(j)
X [t] ·Ql + y
e(j)[t] = 0, (4.6)
where ye(j)[t] is the trader’s expected trading quantity of the risk-free asset in
period t. The trader expects the portfolio holding after trading in period t as
(y
(j)
0 [t] + y
e(j)[t], Z
(j)
0 [t] + Ql). Complying with the budget constraint (4.6), the
trader considers the mean value mean(j)[t] of its future wealth at the end of the
trading period t as:
mean(j)[t] = {qe(j)[t]−R · P
e(j)
X [t]} ·Ql + q
e(j)[t] · Z
(j)
0 [t] +Ry
(j)
0 [t]. (4.7)
The associated variance var(j)[t] is as:
var(j)[t] = {Z(j)0 [t] +Ql}
2 · V e(j)[t]. (4.8)
Assume that trader j takes the linear mean-variance preference. The trader
presents its objective in the submodule of objectives as the portfolio selection
problem:
max
Ql∈Z
mean(j)[t]−
αj
2
var(j)[t] (4.9)
⇔ max
Ql∈Z
{qe(j)[t]− R · P
e(j)
X [t]} ·Ql
+ qe(j)[t] · Z
(j)
0 [t] +Ry
(j)
0 [t]−
αj
2
{Z
(j)
0 [t] +Ql}
2 · V e(j)[t],
where αj is a constant measure of absolute risk aversion. Trader j solves this
portfolio selection problem (4.9) and obtains the integer maximizer Q
(j)
l [t]. Then
the trader submits its limit order with the price-quantity pair (P
e(j)
X [t], Q
(j)
l [t]) to
XAMM via the submodule of action transmission.
Trader j realizes the trading price PX [t] and its transaction volume Z
(j)
X [t] after
XAMM determines the trading price and the trading volume in the price deter-
mination phase. Then the trader completes with XAMM the payment for its
transaction.
After trading the risky asset, trader j attains from the risk-free asset market the
share of risk-free asset y(j)[t] = −PX [t] · Z
(j)
X [t]. The portfolio holding that the
trader acquires after trading in period t is (y
(j)
0 [t] + y
(j)[t], Z
(j)
0 [t] + Z
(j)
X [t]) and
the trader’s initial endowment of the next trading period t+ 1 is{
y
(j)
0 [t+ 1] = R(y
(j)
0 [t] + y
(j)[t]),
Z
(j)
0 [t+ 1] = Z
(j)
0 [t] + Z
(j)
X [t].
(4.10)
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The decision making process of trader j is illustrated in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: Decision making process of trader j in Example 4.3.
Example 4.4 (Trader N). Consider trader N is with the initial endowment of
(y
(N)
0 [t], Z
(N)
0 [t]) at the beginning of the trading period t. Trader N obtains the
interest factor R from the risk-free asset market.
The trader randomly selects Q
(N)
m [t] from the set Qrange of all possible trading
quantities considered by the noise trader. Then the trader constructs its market
order with the quoted trading quantity Q
(N)
m [t] and submits the order to XAMM.
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Trader N realizes the trading price PX [t] and its transaction volume Z
(N)
X [t] after
XAMM determines the trading price and the trading volume in the price deter-
mination phase. Then the trader completes with XAMM the payment for its
transaction.
After trading the risky asset, trader N attains from the risk-free asset market the
shares of the risk-free asset y(N)[t] = −PX [t] · Z
(N)
X [t]. The portfolio holding that
the trader acquires after trading in period t is (y
(N)
0 [t] + y
(N)[t], Z
(N)
0 [t] +Z
(N)
X [t])
and the trader’s initial endowment for the next trading period t+ 1 is{
y
(N)
0 [t+ 1] = R(y
(N)
0 [t] + y
(N)[t]),
Z
(N)
0 [t+ 1] = Z
(N)
0 [t] + Z
(N)
X [t].
(4.11)
The decision making process of trader N is illustrated in Figure 4.7.
XAMM is another type of active economic agent considered in the ACE model.
Its objective is to determine Xetra auction price and the final transaction volume
according to the central order book.
Example 4.5 (XAMM). At the beginning of the trading period t, XAMM has
historical trading prices PX [i] for trading period i ∈ {−KXAMM + 1, . . . , 0} with
the memory span KXAMM > 0. It contains trading information (I0[i], PX [i], ZX [i])
for trading period i ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1} where I0[i] is the order book data set
at the end of the call phase, PX [i] is the Xetra auction price, and ZX [i] =
{Z
(1)
X [i], . . . , Z
(N)
X [i]} is the collection of the final transaction volume Z
(j)
X [i] for
each trader j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. In summary, XAMM at the beginning of the trading
period t is with the historical trading information set
Infor[t− 1] =
{
(I0[t− 1], PX [t− 1], ZX [t− 1]), . . . , (I0[1], PX [1], ZX[1]),
PX [0], . . . , PX [−KXAMM + 1]
}
. (4.12)
During the call phase, XAMM works through the submodule of information ac-
quirement to collect order specifications {Q
(1)
m [t], . . . , (P
e(j)
X [t], Q
(j)
l [t]), . . . , Q
(N)
m [t]}
submitted by traders and stores this information via the submodule of storage.
It simultaneously disseminates the real-time order book data set I0[t].
The objective of XAMM is to determine in the price determination phase the
Xetra auction price PX [t] and the final transaction volumes ZX [t] = {Z
(1)
X [t], . . . ,
Z
(N)
X [t]} by applying Xetra auction trading rules stated in Gruppe Deutsche Bo¨rse
(2003). We apply in our work the formulation of Xetra auction price mechanism
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Figure 4.7: Decision making process of trader N in Example 4.4.
depicted in Theorem 1.1 and Xetra auction allocation mechanism depicted in
Theorem 1.2 respectively. After determining Xetra auction price and the trad-
ing volume, XAMM cancels the unexecuted part of order specifications and con-
ducts the settlement process to complete the payment for each transaction. Then
XAMM closes the market until the next trading period t+1. The updating rules
of XAMM are depicted in Figure 4.8.
The numeraire, the risky asset, and the system clock are passive economic agents
considered in the ACE model. They act as information providers to provide on
request the information about the currency employed in the market, the security
traded in the market, and the time considered in the model. As the environment
of the ACE model, the risk-free asset market provides the trading on the risk-free
asset.
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Figure 4.8: Updating rules of XAMM.
The last step in the integrative framework is to explicitly present the interactions
among agents in the ACE model. We consider dynamics of XAMS with T trading
periods. XAMM starts the call phase at the beginning of the trading period. It
disseminates to traders the real-time trading information of the central order book
and simultaneously collects order specifications submitted by traders. We assume
that traders submit their order specifications in a random sequence during the
call phase. To simplify our analysis, we further assume that price takers submit
limit orders prior to the price setter and noise trader submit their market orders.
The call phase stops randomly after a fixed time span and is followed by the
price determination phase. XAMM determines in the price determination phase
the Xetra auction price and the final transaction volume. Then it cancels the
unexecuted part of the orders and conducts the settlement process to complete
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the payment for each transaction. After trading in Xetra auction market, traders
obtain the risk-free asset holdings via the interaction with the risk-free asset
market. XAMS iterates to the next trading period until it reaches the last trading
period T . The diagram of the interaction in Figure 4.9 explicitly illustrates the
workflows of activities among agents in the market dynamics.
START
END
Time to end the call phase?
yes
no
XAMM: end the trading period
Trader: acquire the trading quantity of the risk-free asset from 
the risk-free asset market
The trading period is T?
XAMM: start the trading period
no
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XAMM: disseminate the 
‘real-time’ trading 
information, collect the 
order specifications
Trader: make 
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submit order 
specifications
trading information
order specifications
The price determination phase
XAMM: compute the 
trading price and the final 
transaction volume, send 
out the trading information, 
cancel the unexecuted part 
of the order
Trader: obtain the 
realization of the trading 
price and the final 
transaction volume
trading information
The settlement process
XAMM: conduct the 
payment process for the 
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payment for the 
transaction
payment
 information
payment
 information
Figure 4.9: Diagram of the interaction for ACE model of XAMS.
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4.3 Market Experiment
We implement the ACE model of XAMS by applying the computer language
Groovy/Java with the database backend of Microsoft ACCESS/MySQL. Then
we construct the market experiment and conduct the computer simulation of
XAMS. The focus of the market experiment is on the generated dynamics of
Xetra auction price. We are specifically concerned with:
1. whether the generated Xetra auction price is generically non market-clearing;
2. the impact of the price setter on the non market-clearing property and on the
volatility of the Xetra auction price in the market.
4.3.1 Experimental Setup
We set up the simulation profile for Xetra auction market experiment by ini-
tializing the parameters and by specifying the forecasting methods employed by
agents.
Model’s Parameters to Initialize
• T = 250 . . . time horizon. The time horizon approximates the time span of one
year when considering one auction for each trading day and 255 trading days
for Frankfurt Stock Exchange in the year of 2009.
• N = 22 . . . number of traders. Three types of traders are considered in the
model with 1 price setter, 20 price takers, and 1 noise trader.
• r . . . the interest rate of the risk-free asset. The interest rate is assumed to
be constant in each profile. According to the Eurostat5, the 3-months interest
rate in the European Union (27 countries) for the period of October 2008 to
September 2009 is in the range of [1.04%, 5.52%]. We choose r randomly from
this range.
XAMM’s Parameters to Initialize
5See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
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• {PX [0], . . . , PX [−KXAMM + 1]} . . . the historical trading prices. We consider
PX [0], . . . , PX [−KXAMM+1] as historical auction prices of the stock “Deutsche
Bo¨rse AG” listed in Xetra for the period from August 27, 2009 to November
04, 2009, with the memory span KXAMM = 100.
6
• rangep = 10% . . . the percentage of the price range. The Xetra platform requires
transactions executed under certain price range from the last traded price Pref .
While it does not publicly provide the information of the percentage of the price
range, another electronic trading platform Euronext requires the percentage of
±10%. We employ the setting in Euronext and choose rangep = 10%. Thus,
XAMM considers Xetra auction price in the range of [Pref(1 − 10%), Pref(1 +
10%)].
Trader’s Parameters to Initialize
• y
(j)
0 [1] . . . trader j’s initial risk-free asset holding at the beginning of the trading
period 1. We take y
(j)
0 [1] as a random positive number.
• Z
(j)
0 [1] . . . trader j’s initial risky asset holding at the beginning of the trading
period 1. We take Z
(j)
0 [1] as a random integer number. To simplify the anal-
ysis, we assume that the aggregated volume in the market is constant with∑22
j=1Z
(j)
0 [1] = 1000.
• α(j) . . . the measure of absolute risk aversion in the trader’s utility function
with the linear mean-variance preference. α(j) is assumed to be constant in
each profile and is selected randomly from the range of (0, 2].
• Qrange . . . the set of the trading behavior for the noise trader j = 22 depicted
in Example 4.4.
We assume that the noise trader randomly chooses for each trading period the
trading behavior from the set of Qrange = { selling 1 unit, buying 1 unit }.
We keep the noise trader’s random choice of trading behavior for each period
the same in the benchmark market experiment as in Xetra auction market
experiment.
Trader’s Forecasting Methods to Initialize
6This historical data of the stock trading price is provided online by Deutsche Bo¨rse, see
http://deutsche-boerse.com.
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1. Forecasting Methods in Common
For each period t, trader j = 1 depicted in Example 4.2 and price takers
j ∈ {2, . . . , 21} depicted in Example 4.3 compute the expected mean value
qe(j)[t] of the risky asset price for the next trading period t+1 and its associated
variance V e(j)[t]. We assume two types of forecasting: the chartist and the trend
trader. The forecasting type remains unchanged in each profile after trader j
randomly chooses between these two types with equal probability.
(a) Chartist
• qe(j)[t] . . . The chartist computes qe(j)[t] as the mean value of the his-
torical trading prices PX [0], . . . , PX [−KXAMM + 1] with
qe(j)[t] =
1
KXAMM
KXAMM∑
n=1
PX [1− n].
• V e(j)[t] . . . The chartist computes V e(j)[t] as the associated variance of
the historical trading prices PX [0], . . . , PX [−KXAMM + 1] with
V e(j)[t] =
1
KXAMM − 1
KXAMM∑
n=1
(PX [1− n]− q
e(j)[t])2.
Thus the chartist has constant forecast of qe(j)[t] and V e(j)[t] for each
trading period.
(b) Trend Trader
• qe(j)[t] . . . Trend trader expects the trend of the price movement based
on the historical price movement. There are two types of trend traders
in our simulation: the trend follower and the contrarian. The trend
follower expects the trading price will increase (decrease) given the
trading price increased (decreased) in the last trading period while
the contrarian expects the opposite. Let the indicator idc = 1 for
trend follower and idc = −1 for contrarian. With historical trading
prices PX [t − 1] and PX [t − 2], the forecasting of the trend trader at
period t is
qe(j)[t] =


PX [t− 1](1 + idc · ω
(j)) if PX [t− 1] > PX [t− 2],
PX [t− 1] if PX [t− 1] = PX [t− 2],
PX [t− 1](1− idc · ω
(j)) if PX [t− 1] < PX [t− 2];
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where ω(j) measures the aggressiveness of the price movement that
the trader expects.
idc and ω
(j) are assumed to be constant after idc is chosen randomly
from {−1, 1} with equal probability and ω(j) is chosen randomly from
the range of (0, rangep].
• V e(j)[t] . . . It is assumed that the trend trader keeps V e(j)[t] constant
in the profile after it is chosen randomly from the range (0, 5].
2. Forecasting Method for Price Setter j = 1 depicted in Example 4.2
• P
e(1)
X [t] . . . the forecast on Xetra auction price in the current trading pe-
riod t. By applying Proposition 3.1, the price setter computes the fore-
cast P
e(1)
X [t](Q
(1)
m [t]) that is essentially its subjective belief on the inverse
demand function of the market with the control variable of the quoted
trading quantity Q
(1)
m [t] in its market order.
• Z
e(1)
X [t] . . . the forecast on the trader’s final transaction volume in the
current trading period t. By applying Proposition 3.2, the price setter
computes Z
e(1)
X [t](Q
(1)
m [t]) that is essentially its subjective belief on the al-
location function of the market with the control variable of the quoted
trading quantity Q
(1)
m [t] in its market order.
3. Forecasting Method for Price Taker j = 2, . . . , 21 depicted in Example 4.3
• P
e(j)
X [t] . . . the forecast on Xetra auction price in the current trading period
t. It is assumed that P
e(j)
X [t] is randomly chosen from the price range
[Pref(1− 10%), Pref(1 + 10%)] stipulated in XAMM.
4.3.2 Experimental Procedure
To investigate the market dynamics and the impact of the price setter in Xe-
tra auction market, we construct along with Xetra auction market experiment
a benchmark market experiment. The benchmark market experiment has the
same setup as Xetra auction market experiment except for the price setter j = 1
depicted in Example 4.2. The benchmark market experiment replaces the price
setter j = 1 with the benchmark trader which follows the same setup as de-
picted in Example 4.2 except for adopting the forecast Z
e(1)
X [t](Qm) = Qm and
P
e(1)
X [t](Qm) = Pref where Pref is the last traded price in Xetra auction market.
Thus, the benchmark trader presents its objective in the submodule of objectives
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as the portfolio selection problem:
max
Qm∈Z
{qe(1)[t]− R · Pref} ·Qm + q
e(1)[t] · Z
(1)
0 [t] +Ry
(1)
0 [t]
−
α1
2
{Z
(1)
0 [t] +Qm}
2 · V e(1)[t], (4.13)
where α1 is a constant measure of absolute risk aversion. As observed in (4.13),
the trader considers in its portfolio selection problem that the current trading
price and the trader’s final trading volume are independent of Qm. The bench-
mark trader is thus regressed to a price taker who has no manipulation on the
current trading price and on the trading volume by its market order.
We consider 50 rounds of market experiments. It starts with initiating 50 sim-
ulation profiles for each round of the market experiment with the index s ∈
{1, . . . , 50}. Then for each profile s, we conduct the benchmark market experi-
ment and Xetra auction market experiment with 250 trading periods of simula-
tions.
4.3.3 Experimental Results
Price Dynamics. We consider the price dynamics for 250 trading periods gen-
erated in the market experiment. Figure 4.10 illustrates the price dynamics gen-
erated by all 50 simulation profiles. The blue color in this figure as well as in the
following figures is for the benchmark market experiment and the red color is for
Xetra auction market experiment.
Figure 4.10 demonstrates the divergence of the price dynamics in the market
experiment. Consider the end-of-period trading price as the market price in the
last trading period t = 250. It ranges [0, 182.67] for all 50 benchmark market
experiments and [0, 205.39] for all 50 Xetra auction market experiments in the
simulation. The histogram of the end-of-period trading price depicted in Figure
4.11 illustrates the divergence that emerges in both market experiments.
Performance of Price Setter. The performance of the trader can be mea-
sured by the ex post Sharpe ratio of the portfolio held by the trader, see Sharpe
(1994). We apply the Wilcoxon signed ranks test to compare in each profile s the
time series of the Sharpe ratio for the price setter with that for the benchmark
trader who assumes its trading behavior has no impact on the market. Statistical
results of the p− value are listed in Table E.1 and Table E.2 for the comparison
on 250 trading periods in all 50 profiles. Table E.1 and Table E.2 show that 18
4.3. MARKET EXPERIMENT 83
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
period
pri
ce
Figure 4.10: Price dynamics in 50 profiles.
profiles accept that the benchmark trader has lower Sharpe ratio than the price
setter with 90% level of confidence; 31 profiles accept that the benchmark trader
has higher Sharpe ratio than the price setter with 90% level of confidence; and
1 profile does not provide any inference from statistical tests. The price setter
performs better than the benchmark trader in 18 of 50 profiles. Thus, it seems
that the price setter does not perform significantly better than the benchmark
trader.
We look into the 18 profiles where the price setter performs better than the
benchmark trader and apply the the Wilcoxon signed ranks test to compare the
percentage of forecast errors that the price setter commits on its expectation on
the future trading price with that of the benchmark trader. The test results
depicted in Table E.3 illustrate that the price setter has lower percentage of
forecast errors than the benchmark trader in 12 profiles, a 67% of 18 profiles
where the price setter performs better. If we look into the 31 profiles where the
price setter does not have better performance, 48% of the 31 profiles have the
price setter with lower percentage of forecast errors, see Table E.4. Thus, it seems
that lower percentage of forecast errors triggers the price setter to have better
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Figure 4.11: Histogram of end-of-period trading price in market experiments.
performance instead of the power of manipulating the current trading price.
The economical intuition behind this finding is that the price setter could only
manipulate the current trading price while sharing the same forecast on the future
price in the next trading period as the benchmark trader. The manipulation on
the current trading price alone does not ensure higher performance.
Property of NonMarket-Clearing Trading Price. We employ the percent-
age of the non market-clearing price percent
(s)
non to investigate the non market-
clearing property of the trading price for each profile s ∈ {1, . . . , 50} with
percent(s)non =
♯{trading periods with non market-clearing trading price}
♯{trading periods with trading price}
.
Figure 4.12 shows the percentage for the benchmark market experiment and
for Xetra auction market experiment in each profile. The lowest percentage of
non market-clearing price is 41.82% and the highest percentage is 96.58% in
our simulation results, which implies that Xetra auction price generated in the
market experiments is generically non market-clearing. This property can be
easily observed in Figure 4.12 where the blue line and the red line are far above
the x-axis.
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Figure 4.12: Percentage of non market-clearing price.
We conduct the Wilcoxon signed ranks test to investigate the impact of the price
setter on the percentage of the non market-clearing price. We specifically test
whether percent
(s)
non associated with the benchmark market experiment is greater
than that associated with Xetra auction market experiment. The null hypothe-
sis is verbally presented as: percent
(s)
non in the benchmark market experiment is
no greater than that in Xetra auction market experiment. The test result has
p− value = 0.0659 < 0.1. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis with 90% level
of confidence and accept that percent
(s)
non in the benchmark market experiment
is greater than that in Xetra auction market experiment. Thus, Xetra auction
market experiment where the price setter participates has a higher percentage of
market equilibrium than the benchmark market experiment. This implies that
the introduction of the price setter increases the possibility of market equilibrium
and thus increases the market efficiency in Xetra auction market.
Intuitively, when there exists a surplus in Xetra auction market the price setter
could submit a market order to accept the surplus without affecting the trading
price in the market. When the price setter would submit a market order exceed-
ing the surplus, the trading price would jump to an inferior position such that
the trading price would fall down when the price setter would submit a market
order in the sell side and vice versa. Thus the price setter has the incentive to
meet but not outnumber the surplus in the market. When the price setter sub-
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mits its market order to fully accept the surplus, Xetra auction market drives
to equilibrium. The introduction of the price setter thus increases the market
efficiency in Xetra auction market.
Price Volatility. We apply in this work the variance of the price dynamics
{P
(s)
X [1], . . . , P
(s)
X [250]} for each profile s to measure price volatility in the market
experiment. The variance of the price dynamics is formulated as:
V ar(s) =
1
249
250∑
n=1
(P
(s)
X [n]− P
(s)
X )
2,
where P
(s)
X is the mean value of {P
(s)
X [1], . . . , P
(s)
X [250]}. Figure 4.13 shows the
variance for the benchmark market experiment and for Xetra auction market
experiment.
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Figure 4.13: Variance of trading price dynamics.
We use the Wilcoxon signed ranks test to investigate the impact of the price setter
on the price volatility. The null hypothesis that we test is verbally presented
as: the variance on the price dynamics for the benchmark market experiment
has the same measure as that for Xetra auction market experiment. The test
result has p− value = 0.8545. We cannot reject the null hypothesis to accept
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that the variance on the price dynamics for the benchmark market experiment is
significantly different from that for Xetra auction market experiment. It seems
that the introduction of the price setter does not significantly impact the price
volatility in Xetra auction market.
Intuitively the price setter influences the price volatility of Xetra auction market
in two different directions. The price setter exploits the market for a profit by
its aggressive trading behavior, which would increase the price volatility in Xetra
auction market. On the other hand, the introduction of the price setter increases
the possibility of market equilibrium. The increase in market efficiency would
allow traders to efficiently adjust their trading behavior to stabilize the market
in equilibrium, which implies a decrease in the price volatility of the market.
These two opposite impacts offset against each other so that the participation
of the price setter would not significantly influence the price volatility in Xetra
auction market.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
In this work we focus on Xetra auction market. We have developed the for-
mal model of Xetra auction market mechanism which is composed of the price
mechanism and the allocation mechanism. We have investigated the economic
properties of Xetra auction price mechanism, which provides hints on how to im-
prove Xetra auction pricing rules from the perspective of market efficiency that is
concerned with the auction market being market-clearing. We have constructed
improved auction pricing rules that are regarded as an improvement on Xetra
auction pricing rules from the perspective of market efficiency.
We have investigated the investment decision of the price setter in Xetra auction
market. We consider that the trader submits a market order to Xetra auction
market. Assuming that the trader obtains the real-time trading information
of the order book and the knowledge on Xetra auction market mechanism, we
have constructed the trader’s forecast on Xetra auction price and on the final
transaction in the step functional form with the control variable of the quoted
trading quantity in its market order. Then we have constructed the extended M-V
model, which combines the conventional M-V model with the trader’s forecast on
Xetra auction price and the final transaction. The computational procedure for
calculating the optimal trading quantity, which solves the extended M-V model,
has been constructed in this work as well.
We have derived in the last part of this work an integrative framework for ACE
modelling from systems theory and the methodology of ABM. We have applied
this integrative framework to develop the ACE model of Xetra auction market
system with an explicit formulation of Xetra auction market mechanism and of
the price setter. We have implemented the agent-based model into computer
software system and conducted the computer simulation for the market experi-
ment. The investigation of simulation results on market dynamics has validated
the property of non market-clearing trading price in Xetra auction market.
Several extensions can be considered in the future. We have considered the market
mechanism of Xetra auction in our work. There are two trading forms in Xetra,
i.e. Xetra auction and continuous trading. The formalization of the market
mechanism for continuous trading is still an open issue given the complexity of
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trading rules in continuous trading, see Gruppe Deutsche Bo¨rse (2003). Thus, to
construct the formal model for the market mechanism of continuous trading and
to investigate its economic properties can be considered in the future work.
Another extension is concerned with the trading behavior considered in the in-
vestment decision in Chapter 3 where the trader is assumed to submit a market
order. Other than the market order, the trader can submit to Xetra auction
market a limit order which also has an impact on Xetra auction price and the
final transaction. One could investigate in the future the trader’s forecast on
Xetra auction price and the final transaction given the trading behavior of sub-
mitting a limit order to the market. Notice that the trader has to decide the
limit price and the quoted trading quantity in the limit order. Thus, the trader’s
investment decision model is with two control variables of the limit price and the
quoted trading quantity in the trader’s limit order, which would make it more
difficult in calculating the optimal solution for the investment decision model.
The final remark is concerned with the flexibility of the agent-based modelling.
In the simulation results of the ACE model of Xetra auction market system, we
have shown the property of non market-clearing trading price in Xetra auction
market. This finding reveals the flexibility of the agent-based model in depicting
non equilibrium market dynamics. Another flexibility of the agent-based mod-
elling demonstrated in our work is on the aspect of modelling active economic
agents. We have applied MAEA to model heterogenous traders in Xetra auc-
tion market with the mean-variance preference in the submodule of objectives.
Essentially the submodule of objectives in MAEA presents the mechanism of se-
lection that the agent employs to choose its action plan. By applying MAEA,
one can easily extend the model of traders by replacing the mean-variance pref-
erence with new criteria of selection that allow more flavor of nonoptimizing and
adaptive behavioral rules. One possibility is to introduce psychological patterns
of decision making in the trader’s submodule of objectives, which is open for the
future work.
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Appendix A
Computational Process for Xetra Auction
Pricing Rules
Based on the description in Gruppe Deutsche Bo¨rse (2003), the flowchart in
Figure A.1 depicts the computational process for Xetra auction pricing rules.
The subprocess Xetra-Auction-PDA(I0) is depicted by the flowchart in Figure
A.2.
START
GIVEN: order 
book data set ?0
Limit order exists?
( ?0=ø? )
Market orders
in both sides of the 
market?
RETURN: Pxetra = Pref
END
Vmax=0?
RETURN: no PXetra
SUBPROCESS:
Xetra-Auction-PDA( ?0)
SUBPROCESS:
Market order 
interruption
no
yes
yesyes
no
no
COMPUTE: Highest 
trading volume Vmax for 
all limit price p in ?0
COMPUTE: the set of all 
volume maximizing prices 
?V={p ?0 | ?V(p) =Vmax}
Figure A.1: Computational process for Xetra auction pricing rules.
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Surplus on the 
demand side? ? ?Z ZP 0? ? ?
END
COMPUTE: the lowest 
surplus Zmin in ?V
Zmin={ |?Z(p)| | p ? ?V }
START
COMPUTE: the lowest 
candidate price with surplus on 
the supply side
Pmax=min{p??Z | ?Z(p)= – Zmin}
COMPUTE: the highest 
candidate price with surplus on 
the demand side
Pmin=max{p ? ?Z | ?Z(p) = Zmin}
RETURN:
PXetra=max{Pmin, min {Pref, Pmax}}
yes
no
yes
no
yes
no
yes
no
No Surplus? ? ? ? ?Z Z Z ZP P 0? ?? ? ?
Surplus on the 
supply side? ? ?Z ZP 0? ? ?
RETURN: XetraP ?? ?? ?Z ref Zmax P ,min P ,P
RETURN: Xetra ZP P?
RETURN: Xetra ZP P?
COMPUTE: The highest 
candidate price 
ZP ?max Z?
COMPUTE: The lowest 
candidate price 
ZP ?min Z?
Only one 
candidate price? 
#?Z=1?
RETURN: XetraP ? ZP
for ZP ? Z?
COMPUTE: the set of all 
candidate prices with the 
highest trading volume and 
the lowest surplus 
?Z={p ? ?V | |?Z(p)| =Zmin}
Figure A.2: Flowchart of subprocess: Xetra-Auction-PDA(I0).
Appendix B
Computational Process for Improved
Auction Pricing Rules
Computational Process for Equivalent Auction Pricing Rules. The
flowchart in Figure B.1 illustrates the computational process for equivalent auc-
tion pricing rules to compute the auction price Pequate. The subprocess Xetra-
Auction-Equivalent-PDA(I0) is depicted by the flowchart in Figure B.2.
START
GIVEN: order 
book data set ?0
Limit order exists?
( ?0=ø? )
Market orders
in both sides of the 
market?
RETURN: Pequate = Pref
END
Vmax=0?
RETURN: no Pequate
SUBPROCESS:
Xetra-Auction-
Equivalent-PDA( ?0)
SUBPROCESS:
Market order 
interruption
no
yes
yesyes
no
no
COMPUTE: Highest 
trading volume Vmax for 
all limit price p in ?0
COMPUTE: the set of all 
volume maximizing prices 
?V={p ? ?0 | ?V(p) =Vmax}
Figure B.1: Computational process for equivalent auction pricing rules.
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RETURN:
Pequate=P?min
END
START
RETURN: Pequate=
max{P?min, min {Pref, P?max}}
yes
Only one
Volume maximizing
price?
#?V=1?
COMPUTE: The highest
volume maximizing price
VP ?max V?
COMPUTE: The lowest
volume maximizing price
VP ?min V?
RETURN:
equateP ? VP ? VP ??Z(P?min)?<??Z(P?max)??
COMPUTE: the upper bound 
volume maximizing price
P?max=min{p ?V | ?Z(p)<0}
COMPUTE: the lower bound 
volume maximizing price
P?min=max{p ?V | ?Z(p) >0}
RETURN:
equate VP P?
RETURN:
equate VP P?
RETURN: equateP ?? ?? ?V ref Vmax P ,min P ,P
??Z(P?min)?>??Z(P?max)??
RETURN:
Pequate=P?max
no
yes
no
no
no
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
no
Z? V(P ) ? Z? V(P ) ?0?
Z? V(P )?0 and 
Z? V(P )?0?
Z? V(P ) ?0 and 
Z? V(P ) ?0?
Figure B.2: Flowchart of subprocess: Xetra-Auction-Equivalent-PDA(I0).
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Computational Process for Improved Auction Pricing Rules. The flowchart
in Figure B.3 illustrates the computational process for improved auction pric-
ing rules to compute the auction price Pimpr. The subprocess Xetra-Auction-
Improved-PDA(I0) is depicted by the flowchart in Figure B.4.
START
GIVEN: order 
book data set ?0
Limit order exists?
( ?0=ø? )
Market orders
in both sides of the 
market?
RETURN: Pimpr = Pref
END
Vmax=0?
RETURN: no Pimpr
SUBPROCESS:
Xetra-Auction-
Improved-PDA( ?0)
SUBPROCESS:
Market order 
interruption
no
yes
yesyes
no
no
COMPUTE: Highest 
trading volume Vmax for 
all limit price p in ?0
COMPUTE: the set of all 
volume maximizing prices 
?V={p ? ?0 | ?V(p) =Vmax}
Figure B.3: Computational process for improved auction pricing rules.
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END
START
RETURN:
Pimpr=½(P?min + P?max)
Only one
Volume maximizing
price?
#?V=1?
COMPUTE: The highest
volume maximizing price
VP ?max V?
COMPUTE: The lowest
volume maximizing price
VP ?min V?
COMPUTE: the upper 
bound volume maximizing 
price
P?max=min{p ?V | ?Z(p)<0}
COMPUTE: the lower 
bound volume maximizing 
price
P?min=max{p ?V | ?Z(p) >0}
yes
no
no
no
yes
yes
yes
no
RETURN:
imprP ? VP ? VP
RETURN:
impr VP P?
RETURN:
impr VP P?
RETURN: imprP ?? ?? ?V ref Vmax P ,min P ,P
Z? V(P ) ? 0  and 
Z? V(P ) ? 0?
Z? V(P ) ? 0  and 
Z? V(P ) ? 0?
Z? V(P ) ? Z? V(P ) ?0?
Figure B.4: Flowchart of subprocess: Xetra-Auction-Improved-PDA(I0).
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. To prove the equivalence of Pequate determined by Theorem 2.1 and
PXetra determined by Theorem 1.1 given the same order book data set I0 in
Assumption 1.1, we investigate each case depicted in Theorem 2.1 and show that
Pequate determined by Theorem 2.1 is equal to PXetra determined by Theorem 1.1
in each case.
Case (I) in Theorem 2.1 selects the auction price Pequate = PV = PV when
there exists a unique volume maximizing price with ♯ΩV = 1, which implies
that case (i) of a unique candidate price in Theorem 1.1 fulfills with ♯ΩZ = 1.
Xetra auction price is thus PXetra = PZ = PZ . Since ♯ΩV = ♯ΩZ = 1, we have
PV = PV = PZ = PZ in this case. Hence, the auction price is Pequate = PXetra for
case (I) in Theorem 2.1.
Case (II.I) in Theorem 2.1 selects Pequate = PV when ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) ≥
0, which implies that candidate prices are with a surplus on the demand side or
with no surplus. Either the situation of one candidate price or the situation of
more than one candidate price with a surplus on the demand side happens in
this case. For the first possibility of ♯ΩZ = 1, Xetra auction price is PXetra = PZ
according to case (i) of Theorem 1.1. The second possibility corresponds to the
case of ΦZ(PZ) > 0. Xetra auction price is PXetra = PZ according to the first case
in (1.12) of Theorem 1.1. Notice that PZ = PV in this possibility since ΦZ(p) is
non-increasing and ΦZ(p) > 0 for all volume maximizing prices p ∈ ΩV . Thus,
the auction price is Pequate = PXetra for case (II.I) in Theorem 2.1.
Case (II.II) in Theorem 2.1 selects Pequate = PV when ΦZ(PV ) ≤ 0 and ΦZ(PV ) <
0, which implies that candidate prices are with a surplus on the supply side or
with no surplus. Either the situation of one candidate price or the situation of
more than one candidate price with a surplus on the supply side happens in this
case. For the first possibility of ♯ΩZ = 1, Xetra auction price is PXetra = PZ
according to case (i) of Theorem 1.1. The second possibility corresponds to the
case of ΦZ(PZ) < 0. Xetra auction price is PXetra = PZ according to the second
case in (1.12) of Theorem 1.1. Notice that PZ = PV in this possibility since ΦZ(p)
is non-increasing and ΦZ(p) < 0 for all volume maximizing prices p ∈ ΩV . Thus,
the auction price is Pequate = PXetra for case (II.II) in Theorem 2.1.
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Case (II.III) in Theorem 2.1 selects Pequate = max{PV ,min{Pref , PV }} when there
exists ΦZ(PV ) = 0 and ΦZ(PV ) = 0, which implies that the third case in (1.12)
of Theorem 1.1 fulfills with ΦZ(PZ) = ΦZ(PZ) = 0. Xetra auction price is thus
PXetra = max{PZ ,min{Pref , PZ}}. Notice that PV = PZ and PV = PZ since
ΦZ(p) = 0 for all p ∈ ΩV . Hence, the auction price is Pequate = PXetra for case
(II.III) in Theorem 2.1.
Case (II.IV) in Theorem 2.1 states the situation of ΦZ(PV ) > 0 and ΦZ(PV ) < 0
for some volume maximizing prices with a surplus on the demand side while
others with a surplus on the supply side, which contains three subcases on the
surplus of the lower bound volume maximizing price P
′
min and the surplus of the
upper bound volume maximizing price P
′
max.
The first subcase is for the situation of |ΦZ(P
′
min)| < |ΦZ(P
′
max)|, i.e. the surplus
of P
′
min is less than the surplus of P
′
max. The auction price is equal to Pequate = P
′
min
according to the first case in (2.2) of Theorem 2.1. Either the situation of one
candidate price or the situation of more than one candidate price with a surplus
on the demand side happens in this subcase. |ΦZ(P
′
min)| < |ΦZ(P
′
max)| implies
that |ΦZ(P
′
min)| is the lowest surplus since |ΦZ(P
′
min)| is the lowest surplus on
the demand side and |ΦZ(P
′
max)| is the lowest surplus on the supply side. In the
situation of ♯ΩZ = 1, Xetra auction price is thus PXetra = P
′
min according to case
(i) in Theorem 1.1 since P
′
min is the unique candidate price. In the situation of
more than one candidate price with a surplus on the demand side, P
′
min is the
highest volume maximizing price with the lowest surplus on the demand side, i.e.
PZ = P
′
min. Xetra auction price is thus PXetra = PZ = P
′
min according to the first
case in (1.12) of Theorem 1.1. Hence, the auction price is Pequate = PXetra in this
first subcase.
The second subcase is for the situation of |ΦZ(P
′
min)| > |ΦZ(P
′
max)|, i.e. the
surplus of P
′
min is greater than the surplus of P
′
max. The auction price is equal
to Pequate = P
′
max according to the second case in (2.2) of Theorem 2.1. Either
the situation of one candidate price or the situation of more than one candidate
price with a surplus on the supply side happens in this subcase. |ΦZ(P
′
max)| is the
lowest surplus and P
′
max is the lowest volume maximizing price with the lowest
surplus on the supply side in this subcase, i.e. PZ = P
′
max. Thus, Xetra auction
price is equal to PXetra = PZ = P
′
max either according to case (i) in Theorem 1.1
in the situation of one candidate price or according to the second case in (1.12)
of Theorem 1.1 in the situation of more than one candidate price with a surplus
on the supply side. Hence, the auction price is Pequate = PXetra in this second
subcase.
The third subcase is for the situation of |ΦZ(P
′
min)| = |ΦZ(P
′
max)|, i.e. the surplus
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of P
′
min is equal to the surplus of P
′
max. The auction price is equal to Pequate =
max{P
′
min,min{Pref , P
′
max}} according to the third case in (2.2) of Theorem 2.1.
|ΦZ(P
′
min)| = |ΦZ(P
′
max)| implies that |ΦZ(P
′
min)| and |ΦZ(P
′
max)| are both the
lowest surplus on volume maximizing prices since |ΦZ(P
′
min)| is the lowest surplus
on the demand side and |ΦZ(P
′
max)| is the lowest surplus on the supply side. The
situation happens in this subcase for more than one candidate price and some
candidate price with a surplus on the demand side while others with a surplus on
the supply side. Xetra auction price is thus PXetra = max{Pmin,min{Pref , Pmax}}
according to the fourth case in (1.12) of Theorem 1.1. Notice that P
′
min = Pmin
and P
′
max = Pmax in this subcase according to the definitions of P
′
min and P
′
max.
Hence, the auction price is Pequate = PXetra in this subcase.
Therefore, the auction price Pequate determined by Theorem 2.1 is equivalent
to PXetra determined by Theorem 1.1 given the same order book data set I0 in
Assumption 1.1.
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Appendix D
Proof of Theorem 3.1
We start with presenting some notations that will be used in this proof. Denote
the set of all limit prices in the order book data set I0 in Assumption 3.1 as
Ω0. After the trader submits the market order Qm, the order book data set
augments to I0 ∪ {Qm} with the new set of all limit prices denoted by Ω
′
0 which
remains the same as Ω
′
0 = Ω0. The new aggregate demand function and the new
aggregate supply function are denoted by Φ
′
D(Qm, p) and Φ
′
S(Qm, p) respectively.
The corresponding trading volume function is denoted by Φ
′
V (Qm, p). The highest
executable order volume is V
′
max with the set of volume maximizing prices Ω
′
V . The
lowest surplus is Z
′
min and the set of candidate prices is Ω
′
Z with P
′
Z = maxΩ
′
Z and
P
′
Z = minΩ
′
Z . We have the following lemmas to derive values of Xetra auction
price function PX(Qm) for different situations of Qm.
Lemma D.1. Given the order book data set I0 in Assumption 3.1 and the explicit
form of ΦZ(p) from Lemma 3.1, the value of Xetra auction price function is
PX(Qm) = P1 for Qm ∈ (−∞,−φ
Z
0 ] and PX(Qm) = PI+J for Qm ∈ [−φ
Z
I+J ,+∞).
Proof. Let Qm ∈ (−∞,−φ
Z
0 ). Then Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) < 0 holds for any price p ∈
R+, which implies that the lowest limit price P1 is associated with the highest
executable order volume and the lowest surplus. Thus P1 is one of candidate
prices with P1 = P
′
Z . Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) < 0 for all limit prices p ∈ Ω0 implies that Xetra
auction price is PXetra = P
′
Z = P1 according to either case (i) in Theorem 1.1 or
the second case in equation (1.12) of Theorem 1.1. When Qm = −φ
Z
0 , we have
Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) = 0 for any price p ∈ A
Z
0 and Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) < 0 for any price p ∈ R+\A
Z
0 .
This implies Φ
′
Z(Qm, P1) = 0 or Φ
′
Z(Qm, P1) < 0. When Φ
′
Z(Qm, P1) = 0, P1 is the
only candidate price. Thus Xetra auction price is PXetra = P1 according to case (i)
in Theorem 1.1. When Φ
′
Z(Qm, P1) < 0 for all limit prices p ∈ Ω0, P1 is the lowest
candidate price with P1 = P
′
Z . Thus Xetra auction price is PXetra = P
′
Z = P1
according to either the case (i) in Theorem 1.1 or the second case in equation
(1.12) of Theorem 1.1. Hence, PX(Qm) = P1 holds for Qm ∈ (−∞,−φ
Z
0 ].
Let Qm ∈ (−φ
Z
I+J ,+∞). Then Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) > 0 holds for any price p ∈ R+,
which implies that the highest limit price PI+J is associated with the highest
executable order volume and the lowest surplus. Thus PI+J is one of candidate
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prices with PI+J = P
′
Z . Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) > 0 for all limit prices p ∈ Ω0 implies that
Xetra auction price is PXetra = P
′
Z = PI+J according to either case (i) in Theorem
1.1 or the first case in equation (1.12) of Theorem 1.1. When Qm = −φ
Z
I+J , we
have Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) = 0 for any price p ∈ A
Z
I+J and Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) > 0 for any price
p ∈ R+ \A
Z
I+J . This implies that Φ
′
Z(Qm, PI+J) = 0 or Φ
′
Z(Qm, PI+J) > 0. When
Φ
′
Z(Qm, PI+J) = 0, PI+J is the only candidate price. Xetra auction price is thus
PXetra = PI+J according to case (i) in Theorem 1.1. When Φ
′
Z(Qm, PI+J) > 0 for
all limit prices p ∈ Ω0, PI+J is the highest candidate price with PI+J = P
′
Z . Xetra
auction price is thus PXetra = P
′
Z = PI+J according to either case (i) in Theorem
1.1 or the first case in equation (1.12) of Theorem 1.1. Hence, PX(Qm) = PI+J
holds for Qm ∈ [−φ
Z
I+J ,+∞).
Lemma D.2. Given the order book data set I0 in Assumption 3.1 and the explicit
form of ΦZ(p) from Lemma 3.1, the value of Xetra auction price function is
PX(Qm) = Pn when Qm ∈ (−φ
Z
n−1,−φ
Z
n ) for n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I + J}.
Proof. For any given n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I+J}, let Qm ∈ (−φ
Z
n−1,−φ
Z
n ) be arbitrary
but fixed. We have Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) > 0 for any price p ∈ A
Z
n−1 and Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) < 0
for any price p ∈ AZn . The values of Φ
′
D(Qm, p), Φ
′
S(Qm, p), Φ
′
V (Qm, p), and
Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) are constant for p ∈ A
Z
n with n = 0, . . . , I + J . With a little abuse of
notations, denote all these constant values to be Φ
′
D(A
Z
n ), Φ
′
S(A
Z
n ), Φ
′
V (A
Z
n ), and
Φ
′
Z(A
Z
n ) for n = 0, . . . , I + J .
For any price p ∈ AZn−1, Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) = Φ
′
Z(A
Z
n−1) > 0 implies that Φ
′
D(A
Z
n−1) >
Φ
′
S(A
Z
n−1) and Φ
′
V (A
Z
n−1) = Φ
′
S(A
Z
n−1). Similarly, Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) = Φ
′
Z(A
Z
n ) < 0 for
any price p ∈ AZn implies that Φ
′
D(A
Z
n ) < Φ
′
S(A
Z
n ) and Φ
′
V (A
Z
n ) = Φ
′
D(A
Z
n ).
It is either Pn ∈ A
Z
n−1 or Pn ∈ A
Z
n . If Pn ∈ A
Z
n−1, then A
Z
n−1 =
[]
Pn−1, Pn] which is
right closed and AZn = (Pn, Pn+1
[]
which is left open. Thus Pn is a limit bid price
since any limit price associated with a right-closed end point in AZ0 , . . . , A
Z
I+J
comes from a limit bid order. Pn is a limit bid price implies that Φ
′
S(A
Z
n−1) =
Φ
′
S(A
Z
n ), which attains Φ
′
V (A
Z
n−1) > Φ
′
V (A
Z
n ) since Φ
′
V (A
Z
n−1) = Φ
′
S(A
Z
n−1) and
Φ
′
V (A
Z
n ) = Φ
′
D(A
Z
n ) with Φ
′
D(A
Z
n ) < Φ
′
S(A
Z
n ). Hence, V
′
max = Φ
′
V (A
Z
n−1) since
Φ
′
V (A
Z
i ) = Φ
′
S(A
Z
i ) ≤ Φ
′
S(A
Z
n−1) = Φ
′
V (A
Z
n−1) for i = 0, . . . , n− 1, and Φ
′
V (A
Z
j ) =
Φ
′
D(A
Z
j ) ≤ Φ
′
D(A
Z
n ) = Φ
′
V (A
Z
n ) for j = n, . . . , I + J . Thus, Pn is the highest limit
price associated with the highest executable order volume and the lowest surplus.
This implies Pn ∈ Ω
′
Z and Pn = P
′
Z . Notice that Φ
′
Z(Qm, Pn) > 0 implies a surplus
on the demand side, Xetra auction price is thus PXetra = P
′
Z = Pn according to
either case (i) in Theorem 1.1 or the first case in equation (1.12) of Theorem 1.1.
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When Pn ∈ A
Z
n , one analogously obtains that Xetra auction price is PXetra = P
′
Z =
Pn according to either case (i) in Theorem 1.1 or the second case in equation
(1.12) of Theorem 1.1. Therefore, one attains that the value of Xetra auction
price function PX(Qm) = Pn when Qm ∈ (−φ
Z
n−1,−φ
Z
n ) for n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I + J}.
Lemma D.3. Given the order book data set I0 in Assumption 3.1 and the explicit
form of ΦZ(p) from Lemma 3.1, the value of Xetra auction price function is
PX(Qm) = P
∗
n when Qm = −φ
Z
n for n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I + J − 1}, where
P ∗n =


Pn CASE 1;
Pn+1 CASE 2;
max{Pn,min{Pref , Pn+1}} CASE 3;
for CASE 1: either AZn = [Pn, Pn+1) or A
Z
n = (Pn, Pn+1) with
|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn) |<|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn+1) |;
for CASE 2: either AZn = (Pn, Pn+1] or A
Z
n = (Pn, Pn+1) with
|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn) |>|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn+1) |;
for CASE 3: either AZn = [Pn, Pn+1] or A
Z
n = (Pn, Pn+1) with
|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn) |=|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn+1) | .
Proof. For any given n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I + J − 1}, Qm = −φ
Z
n implies that
Φ
′
Z(Qm, p) = 0 for any price p ∈ A
Z
n . A
Z
n could be [Pn, Pn+1), (Pn, Pn+1],
[Pn, Pn+1], or (Pn, Pn+1).
If AZn = [Pn, Pn+1), then Φ
′
Z(Qm, Pn) = 0. Pn is the only limit price associated
with a zero surplus. Xetra auction price is thus PXetra = Pn according to case
(i) in Theorem 1.1. Analogously, Xetra auction price is PXetra = Pn+1 if A
Z
n =
(Pn, Pn+1].
If AZn = [Pn, Pn+1], only Pn and Pn+1 are associated with zero surplus. We have
Ω
′
Z = {Pn, Pn+1}. According to the third case in equation (1.12) of Theorem 1.1,
Xetra auction price is thus PXetra = max{ Pn,min{ Pref , Pn+1 } }.
If AZn = (Pn, Pn+1), both Pn and Pn+1 are associated with the highest executable
order volume. Pn has a surplus on the demand side with Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn) > 0 while
Pn+1 has a surplus on the supply side with Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn+1) < 0. If the surplus of
Pn is lower than the surplus of Pn+1 with | Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn) | <| Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn+1) |,
Xetra auction price is PXetra = P
′
Z = Pn according to either case (i) in Theorem
1.1 or the first case in equation (1.12) of Theorem 1.1. If the surplus of Pn is
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higher than the surplus of Pn+1 with |Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn) | >|Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn+1) |, Xetra
auction price is PXetra = P
′
Z = Pn+1 according to either case (i) in Theorem 1.1
or the second case in equation (1.12) of Theorem 1.1. If the surplus of Pn is
equal to the surplus of Pn+1 with | Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn) | =| Φ
′
Z(−φ
Z
n , Pn+1) |, Xetra
auction price is PXetra = max{Pn,min{Pref , Pn+1}} according to the fourth case
in equation (1.12) of Theorem 1.1. Hence, one attains the values of PX(Qm) as
stated when Qm = −φ
Z
n for n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I + J − 1}.
The explicit form of PX(Qm) is attained by combining results in Lemma D.1,
Lemma D.2, and Lemma D.3. Since P1 ≤ P2 ≤ · · · ≤ PI+J , the structure of
values of PX(Qm) implies that it is a non-decreasing step function. Therefore, we
verify Theorem 3.1.
Appendix E
Results of Statistical Test
We use the Wilcoxon signed ranks test to compare the Sharpe ratio between the
price setter and the benchmark trader for 250 trading periods. Table E.1 and
Table E.2 illustrate test results of the p− value for all 50 profiles. These test
results state that 18 profiles accept that the benchmark trader has lower Sharpe
ratio than the price setter with 90% level of confidence; 31 profiles accept that
the benchmark trader has higher Sharpe ratio than the price setter with 90%
level of confidence; and 1 profile does not provide any inference from statistical
tests.
Then we compare the percentage of forecast errors that the price setter commits
on its expectation on the future trading price with that of the benchmark trader
for the 18 profiles where the price setter performs better than the benchmark
trader. The test results of the p− value are depicted in Table E.3. Table E.4
depicts the test results of the p− value for the comparison on the percentage of
forecast errors for the price setter and the benchmark trader in the 31 profiles
where the price setter does not have better performance.
These tables show three types of alternative hypothesis: HA = ”l”, HA =
”two sided”, and HA = ”g”. HA = ”l” refers to the alternative hypothesis
that the benchmark trader has lower Sharpe ratio (percentage of forecast errors)
than the price setter. HA = ”two sided” refers to the alternative hypothesis
that the Sharpe ratio (percentage of forecast errors) of the benchmark trader is
not equal to that of the price setter. HA = ”g” refers to that the benchmark
trader has higher Sharpe ratio (percentage of forecast errors) than the price set-
ter. The inference result ”<” denotes the acceptance of the alternative hypothesis
HA = ”l”; ”>” denotes the acceptance of the alternative hypothesis HA = ”g”;
and ”No Inference” denotes no significant inference derived from the tests.
111
112 Test Results
Profile HA inference
”l” ”two sided” ”g”
1 1 1.83E − 032 9.13E − 033 >
2 1 1.36E − 042 6.79E − 043 >
3 1 1.36E − 042 6.79E − 043 >
4 1 2.43E − 026 1.21E − 026 >
5 1 1.98E − 042 9.89E − 043 >
6 9.84E − 028 1.97E − 027 1 <
7 1 7.42E − 018 3.71E − 018 >
8 1 6.72E − 037 3.36E − 037 >
9 1 2.95E − 018 1.47E − 018 >
10 1 1.36E − 042 6.79E − 043 >
11 1.12E − 008 2.24E − 008 1 <
12 1.33E − 034 2.66E − 034 1 <
13 6.87E − 043 1.37E − 042 1 <
14 1.43E − 039 2.86E − 039 1 <
15 1.20E − 016 2.40E − 016 1 <
16 2.08E − 040 4.16E − 040 1 <
17 1 1.36E − 042 6.79E − 043 >
18 1 2.09E − 032 1.05E − 032 >
19 2.88E − 022 5.76E − 022 1 <
20 0.01 0.01 0.99 <
21 1 1.43E − 015 7.14E − 016 >
22 1 3.24E − 036 1.62E − 036 >
23 1.31E − 038 2.63E − 038 1 <
24 5.26E − 006 1.05E − 005 1 <
25 1 5.92E − 005 2.96E − 005 >
Table E.1: Test results on Sharpe ratio.
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Profile HA inference
”l” ”two sided” ”g”
26 1 1.36E − 042 6.79E − 043 >
27 1 4.23E − 010 2.12E − 010 >
28 3.98E − 032 7.96E − 032 1 <
29 1 1.83E − 032 9.13E − 033 >
30 1 1.36E − 042 6.79E − 043 >
31 5.59E − 005 0 1 <
32 1.31E − 041 2.62E − 041 1 <
33 1 1.48E − 042 7.39E − 043 >
34 1.58E − 035 3.15E − 035 1 <
35 1 1.61E − 040 8.03E − 041 >
36 1 1.36E − 042 6.79E − 043 >
37 1 1.36E − 042 6.79E − 043 >
38 0.8 0.39 0.2 No Inference
39 1 3.88E − 019 1.94E − 019 >
40 1 1.31E − 022 6.53E − 023 >
41 1 4.16E − 042 2.08E − 042 >
42 1 2.69E − 013 1.35E − 013 >
43 3.10E − 019 6.20E − 019 1 <
44 1.48E − 040 2.96E − 040 1 <
45 1 0 8.54E − 005 >
46 1 1.36E − 042 6.79E − 043 >
47 1 1.46E − 018 7.31E − 019 >
48 1 1.35E − 041 6.73E − 042 >
49 6.79E − 043 1.36E − 042 1 <
50 0.98 0.04 0.02 >
Table E.2: Test results on Sharpe ratio (continued).
114 Test Results
Profile HA inference
”l” ”two sided” ”g”
6 0.92 0.15 0.08 >
11 0.95 0.09 0.05 >
12 1 0 7.90E − 005 >
13 0.82 0.36 0.18 No Inference
14 1 0.01 0 >
15 0 0 1 <
16 0.83 0.34 0.17 No Inference
19 1 0.01 0 >
20 1 0 0 >
23 1 0 0 >
24 0.99 0.01 0.01 >
28 0.99 0.02 0.01 >
31 8.69E − 028 1.74E − 027 1 <
32 0.77 0.47 0.23 No Inference
34 9.24E − 010 1.85E − 009 1 <
43 0.99 0.01 0.01 >
44 1 1.38E − 005 6.92E − 006 >
49 1 4.12E − 006 2.06E − 006 >
Table E.3: Test results on percentage of forecast errors in 18 profiles.
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Profile HA inference
”l” ”two sided” ”g”
1 0.74 0.53 0.26 No Inference
2 1 8.67E − 012 4.34E − 012 >
3 2.28E − 006 4.56E − 006 1 <
4 0.98 0.04 0.02 >
5 0.98 0.05 0.02 >
7 1 0 0 >
8 1 0 0 >
9 0.88 0.24 0.12 No Inference
10 0.92 0.16 0.08 >
17 6.64E − 020 1.33E − 019 1 <
18 5.91E − 029 1.18E − 028 1 <
21 0.73 0.55 0.27 No Inference
22 0.94 0.12 0.06 >
25 0.78 0.43 0.22 No Inference
26 0.92 0.15 0.08 >
27 0.93 0.13 0.07 >
29 0.74 0.53 0.26 No Inference
30 5.11E − 024 1.02E − 023 1 <
33 0.26 0.52 0.74 No Inference
35 2.56E − 017 5.13E − 017 1 <
36 0 0 1 <
37 8.80E − 019 1.76E − 018 1 <
39 1.08E − 008 2.17E − 008 1 <
40 1 0 0 >
41 1 1.33E − 007 6.63E − 008 >
42 0.97 0.06 0.03 >
45 0.99 0.02 0.01 >
46 2.40E − 023 4.81E − 023 1 <
47 1 0.01 0 >
48 0 0 1 <
50 1 1.82E − 008 9.11E − 009 >
Table E.4: Test results on percentage of forecast errors in 31 profiles.
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